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Abstract
In light of findings indicating that improved access to relevant informa-
tion is crucial to reduce risk during emergency response, research has em-
phasized the need for decision support tools capable of aiding on-scene
emergency personnel. Motivated by the latter, the aim of this thesis is to
advance an understanding of how visualization can be used as a means
to communicate risk information to operative leaders working in emer-
gency situations. In particular, we identify the needs of operative leaders
regarding access to- and communication of risk information; formulate re-
quirements that solutions for visualization of risk should conform to in
order to meet these needs; develop a solution for visualization of risk that
satisfy these requirements; and evaluate this solution with respect to the
previously identified needs. The identification of the needs of operative
leaders is based on an empirical analysis and review of relevant research.
The evaluation of the solution is based on an analytical walkthrough in-
spection with operative leaders, and comprehensive usability testing. The
findings from the research indicate that operative leaders, in order to make
sound decisions during emergency situations, often need to understand
the underpinning cause of risk, and the location and nature of the physi-
cal objects posing risk. The findings also show that geospatial visualization
is an efficient and effective means for generating such insight, enabling
operative leaders to prioritize between risk objects related to an incident,
and to rationalize why some risk objects are more critical than others.
Keywords: visualization, risk, decision support, emergency response
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Major accidents such as the Froland wildfire [46], the A˚lesund landslide
[47], and the A˚sta railway accident [41] have to a great extent highlighted
both the importance and the challenges of efficient, effective and collabo-
rative emergency management. While emergency situations are character-
ized by a need for immediate and reliable response, emergency response
operations include characteristics such as attention-demanding environ-
ments, harsh conditions, and large amounts of information coming from
multiple sources and actors. A great challenge for the operative leaders
working in emergency situations is first of all developing an adequate un-
derstanding of the given situation, and furthermore, based on this under-
standing, making sound decisions regarding emergency response. To re-
main efficient in this process, operative leaders are critically dependent on
having access to the right information at the right time.
According to a review of enquiries of large incidents in Norway from
1999 to 2008, “lacking acknowledgment of risks due to lack of knowledge” was
found to be the main factor increasing “risk level for rescue personnel and
civilians” [5]. In light of these findings, the same study emphasized the
need to provide on-scene emergency response personnel with “better and
faster access to necessary information and knowledge” in order to reduce risk
in emergency operations [5]. The need for a risk-informed approach to-
wards decision-making is also identified by Rake, who studied leadership
in 22 incidents [45]. Among other things, Rake found that leaders focus on
details, practical solutions and the current state of situations, rather than
on precautionary planning ([44] as cited by [5]).
To aid the process of knowledge construction and decision making in
emergency situations, emergency management departments worldwide
are now putting to use various decision support tools, providing facilities
for data management, graphical display, and data analysis. However, for
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these tools to be useful, they must not only make use of clever computa-
tional methods, but also be efficiently capable of communicating all their
valuable information to operative leaders, who in the end are the true de-
cision makers. As emphasized in [1], human abilities such as creativity
and insight may be just as important as computational power in making
the right decisions during emergency operations, meaning that decision
support tools should be carefully designed to work in harmony with op-
erative leaders abilities for analysis and reasoning.
1.1 Research Focus
In light of findings indicating that improved access to relevant informa-
tion is crucial to reduce risk during emergency response, research has em-
phasized the need for decision support tools capable of aiding on-scene
personnel [5]. Based on the findings of both [44] and [5], these decision
support tools should be specifically aimed at improving operative lead-
ers ability to acknowledge risk in emergency situations. To develop such
decision support tools, there is a clear need for research to understand
how risk information can be efficiently communicated to operative lead-
ers working in emergency situations. In an effort to fulfill this need, the
aim of this thesis is to advance an understanding of how visualization can
be used as a means to facilitate this communication. In the remainder of
this section, we identify the objectives of this research.
Drawing on the nature of emergency situations and the characteristics
of emergency response, a critical success criteria for understanding how
risk can be communicated to operative leaders, is to obtain insight into
the abilities of operative leaders, the work that they do, and the context
of that work. In particular, we should understand (1) how the context of
emergency response affects the way risk information should be commu-
nicated, and (2) what types of information operative leaders need access
to in order to understand risk. To facilitate this understanding, the first
objective of our research is to:
• Identify the needs of operative leaders regarding access to- and
communication of risk information during emergency situations.
To make practical use of the needs identified in the first part of the in-
vestigation, we must determine how these needs impose requirements on
solutions for communication of risk information. Given our research focus,
where we investigate the use of visualization to communicate risk infor-
mation, these requirements should specify what functionality a solution
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for visualization of risk information should support, and how the solution
should behave, in order to fulfill the needs of operative leaders. Benefi-
cially, by specifying a generic set of requirements that solutions for visu-
alization of risk should adhere to, relevant stakeholders can easily make
use of the requirements to propose their own solution. As a result, we in-
crease the practical applicability of our research. Specifically, the second
objective of our research is thus to:
• Formulate requirements that solutions for visualization of risk should
satisfy in order to meet the needs of operative leaders.
The requirements, albeit clarifying what functionality a solution for vi-
sualization of risk should support-, and how a solution should behave in
order to fulfill the needs of operative leaders, do not specify how they can
be satisfied. To shed light on the latter, a major part of our research will
concentrate on developing a solution for visualization of risk that satisfies
the specified requirements and that aims to efficiently and effectively ful-
fill the needs of operative leaders. First and foremost, this research will
investigate how the required risk information can be visualized so that op-
erative leaders can make efficient use of the information. Secondly, the
research will also seek to understand how a solution for visualization of
risk can be implemented technically. To achieve such insight, the third
objective of our research is to:
• Develop a solution for visualization of risk that satisfies the previ-
ously specified requirements.
To advance an understanding of how risk information can be efficiently
communicated to operative leaders, it is not sufficient to build a solution
for visualization of risk and argue theoretically that this solution satisfies
solution requirements. In fact, even though a solution does satisfy the re-
quirements, it might turn out to be both inefficient, and unsatisfactory in
practice. For example, operative leaders might have difficulties interpret-
ing the type of visualization used in the solution, or find it cumbersome
to interact with the solution. Hence, to advance an understanding of how
risk information can be efficiently communicated to operative leaders, our
research should seek to determine to what extent the proposed solution
actually fulfill the needs of operative leaders as identified in the first part
of the investigation. To achieve this, we must evaluate the solution with
respect to these needs. In particular, drawing on the highly specific ap-
plication area of the solution, we find it important to involve operative
leaders in this evaluation. By evaluating the solution with respect to the
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needs of operative leaders, we can also extract valuable knowledge about
the efficiency and effectiveness of specific aspects of the solution. Specifi-
cally, the fourth and last objective of our research is to:
• Evaluate the proposed solution for visualization of risk with re-
spect to the needs of operative leaders.
By providing insight into the needs of operative leaders regarding access
to- and communication of risk information, and through formulating gen-
eral requirements towards solutions for visualization of risk, this research
will be particularly useful in the development of decision support sys-
tems for emergency response. Further, by developing a solution for vi-
sualization of risk, and critically evaluating this solution with respect to
the previously identified needs, this research will also contribute to the
fields of visual analytics, information visualization and risk perception. Last
but not least, our hope is that the research in the end can contribute in in-
creasing the efficiency and effectiveness of decision making in emergency
situations.
1.2 Chapter Guide
In Chapter 2 we elaborate more extensively on the nature of emergency
management, the challenges of decision making in emergency situations,
and the use of visualization as a tool for risk communication. Following
this, we describe and discuss our choice of research methods in Chapter 3.
The first part of our findings is presented in Chapter 4, where we identify
the needs of operative leaders regarding access to- and communication of
risk information. In Chapter 5, we utilize the identified needs to formulate
a set of requirements that solutions for visualization of risk should meet in
order to fulfill the identified needs.
In Chapter 6 we present the first version of our solution for visualization
of risk, which is then thoroughly evaluated and discussed in Chapter 7.
Based on the results from the first evaluation, we then introduce a revised
version of our solution in Chapter 8.
The revised solution is evaluated and discussed in Chapter 9, before we
propose how the solution can be implemented technically in Chapter 10.
In Chapter 11 we summarize and conclude this thesis, and point out di-
rections for future work.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we give a short introduction to the fields of emergency man-
agement, decision making and visualization of risk, clarifying why visualiza-
tion of risk can be a useful tool to support decision making in emergency
situations. The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1 we explain
emergency situations and define risk. In Section 2.2 we take a closer look at
emergency management. A description of decision making in emergency
operations is provided in Section 2.3, followed by an account for the field
of visualization in Section 2.4. In the last part of this chapter, Section 2.5,
we give a review of start-of-the-art principles for visualization of risk.
2.1 Emergency Situations
An emergency is an acute situation that pose immediate risk to human
welfare, environment or security [9] requiring immediate and reliable ac-
tion, to save the assets at stake. Following from the definition above,
emergency situations are also characterized by risk, which, following the
ISO31000 standard on risk management, can be defined as “a combination of
the consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the as-
sociated likelihood of occurrence” [22]. This definition includes at least two
keywords in need of further explanation. The first of these two words,
consequence, refers to the impact the occurrence of an event can have on
the world (e.g. loss of life, damage to the environment) [22]. The second
word, likelihood, refers to the probability of this event occurring [22]. Fur-
thermore, there are also factors affecting likelihood and/or consequence,
which we in this thesis refer to as underlying factors. Examples of such fac-
tors in the context of a wildfire may include wind-strength, temperature,
the age of the forest, and the number of people in the area.
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2.2 Emergency Management
Emergency management concerns dealing with, or avoiding emergency
situations [17], and involves four general phases including; mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery [17]. In emergency response, which
is the phase we will focus on in this thesis, management is typically lead
from some kind of central operation center, or from a temporarily, mobile
local control post, in close proximity of the affected area [37]. The leaders
of these control posts and operation centers are often seen as the operative
leaders of the operation, responsible for assigning tasks to other staff, and
for making decisions regarding emergency response.
Emergency response operations are characterized by attention-demanding
environments, harsh conditions, and large amounts of information com-
ing from multiple sources and actors. A great challenge for the opera-
tive leaders working in emergency situations is first of all developing an
adequate understanding of the given situation, and furthermore, based
on this understanding, making sound decisions regarding emergency re-
sponse. To remain efficient in this process, operative leaders are critically
dependent on having access to the right information at the right time.
Drawing on the nature of emergency situations and the characteristics
of emergency response it is clear that the latter is a field that impose chal-
lenging demands both for operative leaders and the equipment that they
utilize. As a result, there should be a strong compliance between the needs
of the personnel and the design of their tools and equipment.
2.3 Decision making in Emergency Response Op-
erations
Decision making in emergency response operations is often assisted by
some sort of decision support system, which refers to any kind of soft-
ware designed to increase humans ability to make decisions [43]. In this
section, we highlight some of the challenges regarding decision making in
emergency response operations, and then look at how these challenges can
be overcome through a close integration of human abilities and decision
support systems.
Drawing on the aforementioned characteristics of emergency situations
and emergency response operations, there are many obvious challenges
regarding decision making in emergency response operations. First and
foremost, there is the time-critical aspect of emergencies, meaning that op-
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erative leaders must make decisions as fast as possible. Furthermore, to
make sound decisions, personnel typically rely on access to many different
types of information from multiple sources that must be integrated, ana-
lyzed and understood before a choice can be made. Additionally, draw-
ing on the dynamic nature of emergency situations, this information may
change in a matter of seconds due to changes in the environment, making
it necessary to reconsider the decision problem. With respect to the nature
of emergencies, there are also challenges related to the representation of
decision problems and their relevant data, in decision support systems.
Emergencies inherently have a spatial component, referring to the geo-
graphic location and/or extent of the emergency, and a temporal compo-
nent, referring to changes in the state of the emergency due to changes in
time. This spatiotemporality pose great challenges towards representing
decision problems in a realistic manner in decision support systems.
As a result of all the challenging aspects of decision problems in emer-
gency situations, tackling them may be demanding not only for humans,
but also for computers. Although a decision support system can be of
great value for data management, graphical display, and data analysis, it
is unrealistic that any decision support system will provide perfect solu-
tions to all decision problems. A decision support system is there to aid
the process of decision making, not to independently control it. As high-
lighted in [1], human abilities such as creativity and insight may be just
as important as computational power in making the right decisions. De-
cision making in its optimal form should, according to [1], thus efficiently
utilize the unique abilities of both humans, and decision support systems,
in a synergistic fashion. In order to achieve this, [1] maintains that deci-
sion support tools for emergency management must be designed to work
in harmony with operative leaders’ abilities for analysis and reasoning,
and within the context of emergency operations. From this perspective,
which is also the perspective we will take in this thesis, decision support
is as much about maximizing human abilities, as it is about computational
methods.
To support human analysis and reasoning, it is first and foremost nec-
essary to communicate the relevant information in a way that affords effi-
cient and effective human understanding. In the domain of emergency re-
sponse operations, one crucial part of this information is information con-
cerning risk. Through communication of risk information, decision mak-
ers can achieve an understanding of likelihood, consequences and factors
involved in an emergency situation, which in return should make them
better equipped for making the right decisions.
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2.4 Communication through Visualization
One option for communication of risk information in a decision support
system, is through visualization, which in this context concerns communi-
cation of information by making it visible to the eye through some kind of
graphical representation. In fact, drawing on the aforementioned charac-
teristics of emergency situations, visualization might be an exceptionally
fruitful means for communicating risk in these situations. Using state-
of-the-art visualization technology, we can generate dynamic, interactive
visualizations, making it possible to represent both the spatial, and the
temporal aspects of risk in emergency situations. Based on research show-
ing that we “learn and remember best through pictures, not through written
or spoken words” [33], visualization of risk may also be viewed as more
promising than other means of communication. The advantages of using
visualization to communicate risk are also emphasized in [3, 19].
Historically, visualization in its basic sense has been around for thou-
sands of years, where early examples include Greek geometry, various
forms of maps, and even cave paintings. Today, the discipline of visual-
ization has developed into a broad, ever-expanding field that encompass a
wide range of techniques (e.g. charts, graphs, maps), attributes (e.g. color,
texture, dimensionality, interactivity), applications of use (e.g. scientific,
educational, product simulation), and subareas. One of these subareas,
geovisualization, provides us with a basis for our further discussion.
Geovisualization is in close relation to cartography and interactive vi-
sualization, and aims to communicate geospatial information, in a form
that, in combination with human understanding, affords data-exploration
and decision making [31, 25, 30]. Typically, geovisualizations make use
of the map metaphor, by linking data with its spatial location on a digital
map, and by supporting interactive manipulation of this representation.
Generally, geovisualizations thus combine the power of cartography (e.g.
efficient representation of objects in terms of their properties, location, and
relation to each other), with the power of computers (e.g. interactive, dy-
namic representation of graphics and computational methods).
Another relevant subarea in the field of computer generated visualiza-
tions, is visual analytics, which is defined as “the science of analytical reason-
ing facilitated by visual interactive interfaces” [55]. In comparison with geo-
visualization, visual analytics is less specific in terms of what type of data
they concentrate on, and more concerned about making the visual repre-
sentations and interactions suited for human analytical reasoning [55]. At
the same time, there are also many similarities between geovisualization
and visual analytics, especially with regards to purpose, such as support-
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ing decision making processes [30, 55].
Recently, in relevance to the similarities and differences between geo-
visualization and visual analytics, another subarea has evolved. Geovisual
analytics is an area of research that combines concepts from visual analytics,
geovisualization, information visualization (visual representation of abstract
phenomena [2]) and human computer interaction. The aim of Geovisual
analytics is to find ways of providing “computer support to solve space-related
decision problems through enhancing human capabilities to analyze, envision,
reason, and deliberate” [1]. Albeit more general, this aim also roughly en-
capsulates the aim of this thesis, which from this perspective is to support
decision making in emergency operations by enhancing operators capa-
bilities of analytic reasoning with risk information, through a carefully de-
signed solution for visualization of risk.
2.5 State-of-the-Art
Most research regarding visualization of risk has focused on the use of
simple graphical elements, such as histograms and symbols, and specific
visual attributes such as color, size and animation [3]. In this section, we
take a closer look at some of these graphical elements and attributes, ex-
plaining how they can be used in visualizations to affect viewers’ percep-
tion of risk. It should be emphasized that parts of this section is largely
based on the review of seismic risk and uncertainty visualization given in [3],
and the section representing risks found in [19].
2.5.1 Graphical Elements for Risk Visualization
Various forms of graphical elements can be effective means for visualiza-
tion of risk. Research has shown that a graphical representation of risk
can significantly increase risk avoidance in comparison with risk repre-
sented in a numerical form [50]. Furthermore, findings have also shown
that graphical representations can increase human understanding of risk
uncertainty [21, 34].
One popular way of visualizing risk is through using various types of
statistical diagrams, such as graphs, histograms, and pie charts [3]. Sta-
tistical diagrams can provide an intuitive representation of many aspects
concerning risk, such as risk value, underlying factors, or to compare a
large number of risks with one another simultaneously. An advantage
with many statistical diagrams is that they have been thoroughly tested in
terms of how they are interpreted by humans. In regard to this it should
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also be emphasized that statistical graphical elements can be misleading,
if they are not constructed in a proper way. Additionally, there may also
be various effects on the perception of risk, depending on the type of dia-
gram that is used, as each type is designed for different purposes. As an
example of this it is easy to see that while line-graphs are useful for com-
municating trends, pie charts may be more valuable in communicating
proportion [20, 3].
Symbols, or various forms of shapes, have also been used to commu-
nicate certain types of risk information. Well known examples of this in-
cludes the skull and crossbones symbol that typically can be found on the
label of poisonous substances, or the flame symbol found on flammable
chemicals. In comparison with statistical graphical elements, which are
good at illustrating level of risk, the strength of symbols is their ability
to indicate conceptual meaning. When looking at a flame symbol, we in-
tuitively understand what it means, as its symbolic meaning refers to a
concept we are familiar with. Drawing on this, symbols may be benefi-
cial for visualizing underlying factors affecting risk [19], or consequence
associated with risk (e.g. damage to property, loss of life).
Other graphical elements used for risk visualization includes risk lad-
ders, and stick figures [3]. A risk ladder is typically made up of a graphical
representation of a ladder, where each step upwards represent an increase
in risk, while each step downwards represent a decrease in risk. By plac-
ing a risk on its respective level on the ladder, it is easy to get a notion of
its criticality by looking at its position in relation to the upper and lower
bounds of the ladder [3]. As mentioned already, stick figures may also be
effective means for communicating risk. Using stick figures in a diagram,
one can achieve a more intuitive representation of the consequences re-
lated to a risk, by showing for example how many lives that is at stake by
representing each life by a stick figure. In relevance to this, research has
shown that people are more willing to pay for risk reduction when they
are shown risk information using stick figures than they are when they are
shown the same information in a numerical form [50, 3].
2.5.2 Graphical Attributes for Risk Visualization
In general, the attributes discussed in the following paragraph should not
be seen as separate from graphical elements, but rather as the properties
that affect their presentation. Below we will present some of the most
well-known attributes used to enhance the visualization of risk.
The use of different colors to represent different levels of risk has shown
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to be effective for influencing our perception of risk [58], and examples of
such use can be found in many objects of everyday life (e.g. traffic lights,
exit signs). According to [58], there is also a hierarchy in different colors
ability to represent risk, where red is perceived as representing a higher
risk than yellow, which is perceived as representing a higher risk than
green. However, it should be noted that these findings may differ de-
pending on culture [24]. Another study that may be of interest for the
representation of risk, shows that color is more efficient than both shapes
and characters in terms of “display search time” ([8] as cited by [19]), which
refers to the time it takes a person to locate a specific object on a display.
Drawing on these results, [19] suggests that color could beneficially be
used to set focus on the most critical incidents. However, in general terms,
this finding also suggest that color in addition to represent risk critical-
ity, can also be utilized for distinguishing between various concept types
[19]. One could, for example, as suggested in [58] utilize color to represent
the importance of the various underlying factors affecting risk, where the
most important factors are marked with a red color, while the least impor-
tant factors are colored green. In relevance to this, Hogganvik emphasize
that one should try to limit the number of colors one use to between 5 and
8, as more than this may cause the viewer to forget which color belongs to
which concept [19].
To a certain degree, the size of a graphical element representing risk,
may be used to indicate the risks’ level of importance (e.g. a big symbol
can represent a higher level of criticality than a smaller symbol), or its
dimensions (e.g. the size of a shape representing a risk in a map indicates
the area affected by the risk). It should be noted however, that in similarity
with the use of colors, one should also limit the number of different sizes
one makes use of. According to the review given in [19], the number of
different sizes one can efficiently distinguish between could be as low as
four.
Text affords “rapid processing of information” [48], and hence can also be
useful for giving meaning to graphical elements representing risk. On the
basis of studies showing that text in the form of digits, letters and words
are more efficient than colors and shapes in terms of processing speed,
and less demanding in terms of subjective workload, Hogganvik suggests
that text labels may be used in combination with graphical elements, to
provide the viewer with additional information concerning “magnitude or
seriousness of risks, unwanted incidents and more” [19].
Another important aspect of graphical elements is their dimensionality,
which typically refers to using either two-dimensional or three-dimensional
rendering. In contrast to the popular belief that three-dimensional graph-
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ics are better than two-dimensional, research has shown that this is heavily
dependent on what you are trying to achieve [3]. Some studies find that
three-dimensionality is better for navigation than two-dimensionality [18],
while other studies find that two-dimensionality is more efficient than
three-dimensionality [26], or that the two are equally efficient [4]. In rel-
evance to dimensionality in risk perception, [3] suggests that one should
use three-dimensionality for communication of “high-consequence low prob-
ability hazards”. This suggestion is based on other studies showing that
when in unfamiliar situations, viewers have a need for more depth cues to
achieve an insider view of the situation, than they have in familiar situa-
tions [4].
Animation is an obvious means for communicating the dynamic na-
ture of risk. Not only can it be used to continuously visualize the cur-
rent state a risk is in, but also to visualize predicted change in risk over
time. Additionally, much research has been done in applying animation
to represent uncertainty, which is an important factor in the nature of risk.
One example of this research can be found in [32], where it is suggested
that uncertainty can be represented directly through the duration of time
a given area has a given color (e.g. “long duration in one color = high cer-
tainty of classification” [32]). Another example also found in [32], describes
a more indirect representation of uncertainty, through animating the dif-
ferent pathways the current situation may take.
Some research also suggest that texture can be used to represent un-
certainty [32] through variations in visual attributes such as “coarseness,
regularity, lightness, and contrast” [7] as cited by [3]. As an example of how
this could work, finer texture may refer to a higher level of certainty, while
a rougher texture could imply a lower level of certainty.
In this chapter we have given a short introduction to the fields of emer-
gency management, decision making, and visualization of risk, clarifying
why visualization of risk may be a useful tool to support decision making
in emergency situations. In the next chapter, we move on to describe the
research methods utilized in this thesis.
Chapter 3
Research Methods
As an overall research methodology for this thesis, we have adopted the
interaction design approach outlined in [49], emphasizing a user-centered
design process [39]. The rationale for adopting this approach, was that it
provides a clear distinction between user needs, solution requirements, and
solutions. In this chapter we describe the research methods utilized in this
thesis with respect to the activities of this approach, and the research objec-
tives outlined in Chapter 1. In Section 3.1 we present the methods utilized
for identifying user needs. In Section 3.2 we describe how we then converted
these needs into a set of requirements. The solution design approach is pre-
sented in Section 3.3 followed by a description of the methods utilized to
evaluate solutions in Section 3.4.
3.1 Identifying Needs
The purpose of identifying a set of user needs was to understand what
types of risk information operative leaders need access to in order to make
sound decisions in emergency situations, and to determine how the com-
munication of this information should be facilitated for the leaders to make
efficient use of it. In order to achieve the latter, we believe it is impor-
tant to develop an understanding of the operative leaders themselves, the
work that they do, and the context of that work. To facilitate this kind of
comprehensive user understanding, there are many fruitful research tech-
niques available, all with their respective advantages and disadvantages.
In particular, within the field of HCI, data gathering techniques such as
interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, and observations have proved
useful for understanding users [49]. In the work with this thesis however,
we only had a short amount of time on our hands. If we were to go out
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and do a thoroughly qualitative investigation ourselves, conducting inter-
views, observations and/or focus groups, we would probably never have
finished the thesis on time. Hence, instead of conducting any such inves-
tigations, the user need analysis was carried out by means of a thorough
analysis of relevant existing research. Generally, the analysis consisted
of going through all the relevant research we could find, while carefully
interpreting information in light of access to- or communication of risk
information. Simultaneously, we also made an effort to rationalize why
the acquired information was relevant. The results from the analysis is
summarized and presented in Chapter 4.
3.2 Formulating Requirements
The purpose of developing a set of requirements was to understand and
define what functionality a solution for visualization of risk should sup-
port, and how the solution should behave, in order to fulfill user needs.
To convert the set of user needs into a set of requirements, we carried out
an exhaustive process of interpreting and analyzing the identified needs,
gradually, developing an understanding of how the needs imposed re-
quirements towards a technical implementation. In particular, we focused
on making the requirements as clear and concise as possible, so that one
can easily tell whether or not a requirements has been met or not. Addi-
tionally, we also made an effort to try and keep the requirements as unam-
biguous as possible.
To guide the process of producing requirements, we first considered
making use of requirement specification templates, such as the Volere shell
[56], that highlight the information that is important to capture in the de-
scription of a requirement. However, after trying out these templates, we
found them to be more limiting than helpful, and furthermore cumber-
some to present to readers. Drawing on these issues, we ended up rather
focusing on dividing the solution into components, describing require-
ments in terms of criteria that each component should conform to. For
further clarity we also made use of diagrams to explain and document the
structure of these components. The resulting set of requirements is pre-
sented in Chapter 5.
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3.3 Designing Solutions
The goal of the design activity was to develop a solution for visualization
of risk that satisfies the requirements discussed in Section 3.2 above, and
thus as a result also fulfills operative leaders’ needs regarding access to-
and communication of risk information. As a philosophy for the design
activity we were inspired by the evolutionary design approach described
in [49], “which involves evolving a prototype into the final product”. In accor-
dance with this approach, we wanted to determine how risk information
should be visualized before commencing a technical implementation, and
thus avoid wasting time implementing a solution that may produce in-
comprehensible and inaccessible visualizations. Based on this, we first de-
voted our attention to developing a conceptual risk visualization design,
denoting how various types of risk information should be expressed vi-
sually (see Chapter 6). This first design was then evaluated, and revised
into a new conceptual design (see Chapter 8). Following the evaluation
of the revised conceptual design, we then moved on to propose a tech-
nical design (see Chapter 10), denoting and explaining how each of the
components, along with the conceptual design introduced earlier, could
be implemented technically. In general, the solution thus evolved from a
conceptual model, into a detailed physical implementation.
The conceptual risk visualization design was described by means of
written specifications including figures illustrating and exemplifying how
the various types of risk information should be represented graphically.
For the purpose of evaluation, we also built a set of fully interactive pro-
totypes exemplifying the conceptual designs. These prototypes are dis-
cussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7 and Chapter 9.
3.4 Evaluating Solutions
The general aim of the evaluation was to determine to what extent our
proposed solution for visualization of risk satisfies the needs of operative
leaders. In this section we will describe and discuss the methods we have
utilized to evaluate our solution. To start this discussion, we first take a
closer look at the 3 main evaluation approaches suggested by [49], includ-
ing:
• Usability testing which involves “measuring users’ performance and
evaluating their satisfaction with the system in question on certain
tasks in a laboratory setting” [49].
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• Field studies where a system is evaluated in a natural setting with
the aim to see how users utilize a system naturally, in real life [49].
• Analytical evaluation where a system is evaluated by means of in-
spection methods or user modeling techniques [49].
For each evaluation approach as listed above, there are advantages and
disadvantages. While field studies provide a very high degree of realism
(i.e. high ecological validity), usability tests enables one to carefully mea-
sure and control all evaluation variables (high internal validity). The great
advantage of analytical evaluation methods is that they generally require
very few resources compared to field studies and usability testing. Draw-
ing on the different qualities of the 3 approaches, we believe the best result
can be achieved through combining approaches, enabling us to shed light
on the solution from different perspectives. Unfortunately however, due
to the short amount of time available for the work with this thesis, and the
complexity of arranging realistic emergency situation drills, we did not get
the opportunity to evaluate our solutions through field studies. Instead,
the first evaluation took the form of an analytical evaluation walkthrough,
while the second and last evaluation was conducted by means of usability
testing. In the sections below, we elaborate further on each of these meth-
ods. Notably however, a more detailed description of the methods can
be found in the respective evaluation chapters presented later in this thesis
(see Chapter 7 and Chapter 9).
3.4.1 Analytical Evaluation
Traditionally, analytical evaluation has typically involved inspection meth-
ods such as heuristic evaluation, cognitive walkthroughs, and user perfor-
mance modeling (e.g. GOMS [6], Fitts’ Law [11]), where usability experts
evaluate a design, without involving actual users in the evaluation [49].
In recent years however, some of the techniques applied within analyti-
cal evaluation has been adapted so that usability experts, domain experts
and/or end users work together when evaluating a design. In particu-
lar, this type of collaboration has been utilized in so-called walkthrough
techniques, which “involve walking through a task with the system and noting
problematic usability features” [49]. To evaluate the first conceptual visual-
ization design, we conducted a study inspired by two such collaborative
walkthrough techniques, including pluralistic walkthroughs, and group-
based expert walkthroughs.
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A pluralistic walkthrough is a form of walkthrough where users, devel-
opers and usability experts collaborate in stepping through a task-scenario,
highlighting usability issues along the way ([35] as cited by [49]). Partic-
ularly, participants are asked to elaborate on how they would utilize the
evaluated interface to solve a given task, or how they would go about step-
ping from one part of the interface to another. This way, instead of telling
the participants exactly how things work, they are asked to interpret how
the interface works. A quote highlighting this process is included below:
“The scenarios are presented to the panel of evaluators and the pan-
elists are asked to write down the sequence of actions they would take
to move from one screen to another. They do this individually without
conferring with one another.” [49]
Drawing on the quote above, one advantage of the pluralistic walkthrough
approach, is that it enables us to determine how participants interpret
various parts of the risk visualization. However, based on the results of
[13], and the highly domain specific application area of the solution, we
also believe it is important to involve work-domain experts in the evalua-
tion. One specific approach towards involving domain experts in inspec-
tion methods is through a group-based expert walkthrough, as introduced by
Følstad in [12]. In this approach, a group of work domain experts eval-
uate a user-interface together by stepping through a set of task-scenarios
related to an interface, while identifying usability problems and/or design
improvements [12]. By combining the pluralistic walkthrough technique
with the group-based expert walkthrough technique, we ended up with
an evaluation design where work-domain experts (fire lieutenants) were
utilized as evaluators, and where issues were identified first and foremost
based on the evaluators interpretation of the risk visualizations. Notably, a
more detailed description of this evaluation method can be found in Chap-
ter 7.
3.4.2 Usability Testing
For the second evaluation conducted in the work with this thesis, as pre-
sented in Chapter 9, we made use of usability testing, which involves “mea-
suring users’ performance and evaluating their satisfaction with the sys-
tem in question on certain tasks in a laboratory setting” [49]. In differ-
ence from traditional usability testing however, where participants typi-
cally perform specific tasks, this study made use of high-level, open-ended
tasks, where participants were encouraged to explore risk visualizations
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in their own way while utilizing a think aloud protocol, as suggested by
North in [40]. Claiming that “the purpose of visualization is insight” [40],
North suggests that a visualization evaluation should involve an “open-
ended protocol” as opposed to traditional benchmark tasks, a “qualitative
insight analysis”, and an emphasis on “domain relevance”. The advantage
of this approach, in comparison with traditional usability testing, is that it
eliminates the bias created by instructing users in what they should look
for in the visualizations, enabling us to determine what users understand
on their own, as described in the quote below:
“This method’s fundamental concept is to change the benchmark
tasks from an independent to a dependent variable. Hence, instead of
instructing users in exactly what insights to gain, researchers observe
what insights users gain on their own.” [40]
The usability testing was documented by means of observation, audio
recording and screen capture (recording screen output). Additionally, a
user satisfaction questionnaire was utilized, enabling participants to give
their subjective opinion regarding various aspects of the solution, point
out strengths and weaknesses, and make suggestions for improvements.
Notably, a more detailed description of the evaluation method can be found
in Chapter 7.
In this chapter we have described the research methods utilized in the
work with this thesis, including our approach towards identifying user
needs, producing requirements, designing solutions and evaluating solu-
tions. In the next chapter, we present and discuss the findings from the
user needs analysis, as outlined in Section 3.1 above.
Chapter 4
Risk Visualization Needs
In this chapter we present the findings from the user needs analysis as
outlined in Chapter 3. The findings are based on a review of existing re-
search, and consist of two main parts. In Section 4.1 we identify what types
of risk information operative leaders need access to in order to make sound
decisions in emergency situations. In Section 4.2 we describe needs re-
lated to the communication of risk information to operative leaders. A table
summarizing the identified needs is provided at the end of each section.
4.1 Risk Information Needs
Emergency situations are made up of risk, which is defined as “a combina-
tion of the consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the
associated likelihood of occurrence” [22]. In accordance with this definition, a
risk is often represented by means of a risk-value, holding the product of
consequence and likelihood. However, although risk can be represented by
means of a single value, it is clear that the concept of risk is considerably
more complex than this numerical representation suggests. Depending on
the level of understanding one wants to achieve, it might also be fruitful
to understand not only risk consequence (i.e. “the impact of an unwanted in-
cident on an asset in terms of harm or reduced asset value” [52]) and likelihood
(i.e. “the frequency or probability of something to occur” [52]), but also the
underpinning factors affecting consequence and likelihood. In the domain
of decision-making in emergency situations, the types of risk information
needed to make sound decisions may vary depending on the emergency
situation, and on the approach towards decision-making and emergency
response. In this analysis, we disregard these variations, and focus on
identifying needs related to risk information on a general basis.
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According to a review of enquiries of large incidents in Norway presented
in [5]:
“The most important factor that increases the risk level for rescue
personnel and civilians are lacking acknowledgment of risks due to
lack of knowledge, causing inadequate counter measures”.
In three out of five cases in the review, increased consequence and/or
likelihood of risk were underestimated because of a lack of knowledge
[5]. Drawing on these findings, [5] identify a need for “better and faster
access to necessary information and knowledge” in order to reduce risk in
emergency operations. The need for a risk-informed approach towards
decision-making is also identified by Rake, who studied leadership in 22
incidents [45]. Among other things, Rake found that leaders focus on de-
tails, practical solutions and the current state of situations, rather than on
precautionary planning ([44] as cited by [5]). Drawing on these findings
Rake also propose an on scene decision making model that “enforces the de-
cision maker to place the focus onto the quantities regarded important” and “re-
quires that the decision maker evaluates uncertainties systematically” [44]. The
findings of [5] and [44], indicate that there is a strong need for decision-
makers to increase their understanding of risk in emergency situations. In
particular, it seems crucial for operative leaders to obtain a better insight
into the consequence and likelihood constituting risk, as an underestimation
of these aspects may have a critical impact on the outcome of a given emer-
gency situation [5].
Related to the communication of consequence and likelihood is also the no-
tion of communicating the impact various decisions might have on risk. In
a decision space consisting of a range of different decisions, where each
decision has its own “distribution of possible consequences”, it might be fruit-
ful to compare decisions in terms of how they will affect the outcome of
the emergency situation [28]. However, as observed by Klein in [27]; if the
outcome of a decision is represented by means of a collapsed probability
value, operative leaders might have difficulties understanding its underly-
ing reasoning, leading them to disregard that decision-option completely.
To a certain degree, Klein’s findings may also affect the way we repre-
sent risk, or more specifically, which information we should make use of
to represent risk. An aggregated risk-value holding the product of likeli-
hood and consequence might not be sufficient for operative leaders to make
any practical use of the information. If, for example, an operative leader
disagrees with a given risk-value and fail to see the underlying reasoning
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behind it, he or she might end up disregarding the value as being wrong,
even though it might not be. Conversely, as another example, it might be
difficult for an operative leader to determine the validity of an unintuitive
risk-value, if he or she is unable to see what constitutes this value. Draw-
ing on this, and the findings of [44] and [5] as discussed above, we argue
that operative leaders not only need access to risk-value (i.e. the product of
consequence and likelihood) information, but also to information describing
the actual consequence and likelihood constituting risk.
As highlighted in the findings of [36], some of the central tasks of op-
erative leaders arriving on the scene of an incident is to maintain informa-
tion regarding various aspects of the incident, conduct risk assessments on
the basis of this information, and decide how to respond to the situation.
By maintaining information about various aspects of the incident, such as
its location, people involved (e.g. critical concentrations of people), and
objects involved (e.g. objects may carry cargo that affect risk), leaders can
assess the current state of the situation, and adapt emergency response ac-
cordingly [36]. Typically however, when conducting risk assessments, it is
not only a matter of understanding the situation as it is at the given point
in time. Additionally, one must assess risk with regards to how the situa-
tion might evolve in the future. To achieve this, there is a need to under-
stand the underlying factors affecting the likelihood and consequence of
risk, how these factors may change in time, and how these changes may af-
fect risk. Examples of this can be found in observations from the TYR drill
as presented in [36], where they (in the scenario of a gas leakage) highlight
the need to collect weather data, and information concerning gas type, in
order to assess risk. If operative leaders are given a consequence value
(e.g. Catastrophic), or a probability value (e.g. Very likely) calculated by
a decision support system, without understanding the underlying factors
constituting these values, they might end up making the wrong decisions,
as the actual risk value might be affected by factors that are not identified
by the decision-support system, but only apparent for operative leaders on
scene. A further discussion about the issues of understanding aggregated
values based on multiple attributes can be found in [27].
Based on the discussion above, we suggest that operative leaders in
addition to detailed information about likelihood and consequence, also
need access to information describing the underlying factors affecting con-
sequence and/or likelihood. By understanding these factors, operative lead-
ers might also be better suited to utilize their own capabilities for ana-
lytical reasoning, which as described by [1], could be of great value for
decision-making in emergency situations.
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The findings from the TYR drill also highlight the need for operative lead-
ers to establish and maintain an operational picture (typically a map),
make decisions regarding which roads to close, maintain information re-
garding location of the incident including “risk assessment issues like de-
ciding secure distance to the location”, and maintain information regarding
objects involved in the incident including cargo that may affect risk [36].
Drawing on these findings, decision-makers may also need access to infor-
mation describing where the relevant incident occurred, what area that is
plausibly affected by this incident, where physical objects posing risk are
located within this area, and the nature of these objects. The value of this
might be especially apparent in situations where we have a large number
of risks spread out over a large area, such as during a wildfire. Large-
scale situations like wildfires, in combination with the need to maintain
an operational picture of the situation, also highlight the need to compare
multiple sets of risk information with one another, in order to determine
what must be dealt with first.
In table 4.1 we summarize the needs identified in this section, describing
what types of risk information operative leaders need access to in order to
make sound decisions in emergency situations.
4.2 Risk Communication Needs
If we are to develop solutions for visualization of risk, it is not enough to
understand what types of risk information that is needed in order to make
sound decisions; additionally, we must also understand needs related to
how this information should be communicated to operative leaders work-
ing in an emergency situation setting. In this part of the user-needs analy-
sis, we concentrate on the latter.
Based on the findings presented in [38], it is important to consider the
conditions and context where decision-making takes place when develop-
ing user interfaces for emergency response. Operative leaders often work
under harsh conditions and attention-demanding environments, in close
proximity to the scene of incident [38]. Decisions must be made as quickly
as possible, and decision-makers must deal with large amounts- and mul-
tiple sources of information. To efficiently communicate risk informa-
tion in this context, the information should be presented in a straightfor-
ward manner that is easily understandable even under stressful, attention-
demanding conditions. The notion of straightforwardness is also closely
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Table 4.1: Risk information needs
No. Description
1 Operative leaders need access to information describing risk-
value (i.e. product of the consequence and likelihood).
2 Operative leaders need access to information describing risk con-
sequence (i.e. the impact of the unwanted incident associated
with the risk occurring).
3 Operative leaders need access to information describing risk like-
lihood (i.e. the probability of the unwanted incident associated
with the risk occurring).
4 Operative leaders need access to information describing under-
lying factors that affect risk consequence and/or likelihood.
5 Operative leaders need access to information describing incident
location, and the extent of the area affected by this incident.
6 Operative leaders need access to information describing the loca-
tion and characteristics of physical objects posing risk within the
area affected by an incident.
7 Operative leaders need access to information describing how
risks differ from one another, in terms of criticality.
related with the time-criticality of emergency situations. The longer it
takes for operative leaders to understand the information they are pro-
vided with, the longer it takes to make decisions, and in the end, resolve
the situation. In the meantime, life and/or property that could have been
saved, might get lost.
Although the work of an operative leader often takes place at a “lo-
cal control post” [38], there are also cases where leaders have to leave this
post, and work in the field [38]. Based on this observation, operative lead-
ers might, depending on the context, need access to risk information not
only while working in a fixed environment, but also when moving about
in an outdoor, mobile setting. Hence, communication of risk information
should support not only fixed devices, but also mobile, handheld equip-
ment.
Based on the large amount of information operative leaders must deal
with in the process of decision-making, the findings of [38] highlight the
need to prioritize information with regards to category, and filter informa-
tion in terms of relevance. By prioritizing information, operative leaders
could reduce the amount of information they have to deal with simulta-
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neously, and thus increase the efficiency of their work. In large-scale situ-
ations with a high number of risks, such as wildfires or gas leaks, there
might also be a need to prioritize risk information. To handle an inci-
dent efficiently, operative leaders must also adapt their effort according
to the current state of the situation, which in the case of emergencies could
change in a matter of seconds. To facilitate this, leaders needs to have
an up-to-date understanding of risk, and be made aware of change in risk,
when this occurs. As highlighted in [38], however, it is important that
communication of change reflects the magnitude of the change. As an ex-
ample of this, a tiny change in likelihood calls for less attention than a
large change in consequence.
In table 4.2 we summarize the findings identified in this section, describing
needs regarding communication of risk information to operative leaders
working in emergency situations.
Table 4.2: Risk communication needs
No. Description
1 Operative leaders need access to risk information while working in
fixed settings such as a local control post.
2 Operative leaders need access to risk information while working in mo-
bile settings, such as while moving about in the field.
3 Operative leaders need to be made aware of change in risk information.
4 Operative leaders need to be able to prioritize risk information.
5 Operative leaders need to be able to filter risk information.
In this chapter we have identified a set of needs describing 1) what types of
risk information operative leaders need access to in order to make sound
decisions in emergency situations, and 2) how this information should be
communicated. In the next chapter, we utilize the needs identified here to
produce a set of requirements describing the criteria a solution for visualiza-
tion of risk must adhere to, in order to satisfy those needs.
Chapter 5
Risk Visualization Requirements
In Chapter 4 we identified a set of needs describing what types of risk in-
formation operative leaders need access to in order to make sound deci-
sions, and how this information should be communicated. In this chapter,
we develop a set of requirements describing what functionality a solution
for visualization of risk should support, and what data it must be capa-
ble of handling, in order to fulfill the identified needs. First however, to
guide the specification of requirements, we introduce a set of assumptions
describing when, where and by whom a solution will be used, which tech-
nology it will run on, and what components it will consist of. Assumptions
are presented in Section 5.1, followed by Requirements in Section 5.2.
5.1 Assumptions
In this section we introduce a set of assumptions describing when, where
and by whom a solution will be used, which technology it will run on,
and what components it will consist of. First and foremost however, to
clarify what a solution is, and what it is not, we make an overall assump-
tion regarding the responsibilities of a solution: In general, we assume a
solution for visualization of risk to be an entity responsible for 1) reading
risk data, 2) converting risk data into risk visualizations, and 3) communicat-
ing risk visualizations to the user interacting with the solution. Following from
this assumption, a solution is not responsible for supplying itself with data
from which visualizations can be produced, but rather dependent on an
external component delivering this data on demand. In Figure 5.1 we il-
lustrate how this external component (represented as a black box) delivers
risk data to a solution, which converts the data into a visualization before
communicating this visualization to a user.
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Figure 5.1: Basic solution structure
5.1.1 Context of Use
As explained in Section 2.1, emergency management may be divided into
four different phases including mitigation, preparedness, response and recov-
ery [17]. These four phases differ not only in terms of the activities they
consist of, but also in terms of the conditions under which these activities
are performed. As an example of this, it is easy to see that the phase of
emergency response, where immediate needs are addressed, typically has
a more attention demanding nature than the phase of emergency recovery,
which typically consists of activities such as rebuilding damaged property.
As a result of these differences, it is also likely that the four phases may
have different demands towards decision-support tools. To limit the scope
of this thesis, we assume that:
• A solution for visualization of risk will only be utilized in the phase
of emergency response, where an incident has already occurred, and
not during less immediate activities such as developing long-term
mitigative measures, or rebuilding damaged property.
Another aspect of the term context is related to the physical conditions un-
der which our solutions will be utilized. Even though Chapter 4 identified
a need for risk information both at the local control post and in the field,
it did not account for typical implications that may arise at these sites.
When working in the field, conditions such as noise, heat and darkness
may demand a different type of solution than conditions such as cold and
daylight. Hence, to constrain the scope of the thesis, we assume that:
• A solution will only be utilized on land and under normal condi-
tions, where normal includes both night and day, noisy and noise-
less environments, weather conditions comprising rain, snow, sun,
overcast and temperatures ranging from -20°C to +40°C.
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5.1.2 Technology
In Chapter 4 we found that operative leaders need access to risk informa-
tion both at a local control post, and in the field. Drawing on this finding,
we assume that risk visualizations will be viewed either on a normal PC
monitor, or on a handheld device such as a PDA or mobile phone. Addi-
tionally, we make the following assumptions regarding these displays:
• The size of the display is no less than 4 inches.
• The resolution of the display is no less than 480x800 WVGA.
• The display supports color depths of at least 18 bits.
• The display provides sufficient back-light to afford viewing in day-
light.
To interact with a solution, we assume that users will be using either a
touchscreen which is typically found in modern mobile phones, or a com-
puter keyboard combined with a mouse pointing device. The advantage of
these forms of interaction is that they are widely tested, cheap, and famil-
iar for a wide range of users.
5.1.3 User Characteristics
To further limit the scope of this thesis, we have decided that we must
also make some assumptions regarding the abilities and disabilities of the
intended users. In particular, we assume that:
• The users of a solution are familiar with using geographical maps (as
digital maps will be utilized as a part of the risk visualizations).
• The users of a solution have no relevant physical or psychical dis-
abilities that may affect their ability to understand or interpret visual
stimuli.
• The users of a solution have no relevant physical or psychical dis-
abilities that may affect their ability to interact with a computer or
mobile device using a keyboard, mouse pointing device or touch-
screen.
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5.1.4 Risk Data
As described earlier, a solution will be dependent on an external compo-
nent supplying it with data from which visualizations can be produced.
Nevertheless, although access to data is crucial for a solution, it is not in-
teresting from the perspective of a solution where this data is coming from.
What is interesting however, is what the external component must to be
provided with in order to supply the solution with data. To clarify this,
we assume that:
• The external component responsible for supplying a solution with
risk data must first be provided with information describing the lo-
cation and nature of the incident the user of the solution wants to
visualize risk for.
The rationale for this assumption is that we find it unlikely that the exter-
nal component itself will be capable of finding out where an incident has
occurred, without being told by a human operator. To further simplify the
design of solutions, we have also decided to disregard the aspect of uncer-
tainty in risk data, and rather assume that all risk data is certain. It should be
emphasized here that when we talk about uncertainty in this context, this
is not equivalent with likelihood. Conversely, uncertainty refers to a doubt
concerning the validity of the risk data itself. While likelihood for example,
denotes the probability of the occurrence of an event, uncertainty related
to this likelihood might tell us the degree to which this information can be
trusted.
5.1.5 Medium of Communication
In the user needs analysis presented in Chapter 4, we identified a need for
emergency operational personnel to understand what area that is affected
by an incident, and how risk is distributed within this area. To facilitate
communication of these geospatial components of risk- and incident in-
formation, we assume that:
• A solution will render visualizations in some kind of digital geospa-
tial environment, such as a digital map or a digital globe.
Digital geospatial environments as mentioned above are not only capable
of providing us with an intuitive platform for visualizing risk information
in direct relation to its location, they also provide us with a medium for
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communication that is familiar for operative leaders, due to their experi-
ence with traditional geographical maps. To a certain degree however, it
also follows from the assumption above that the visualizations produced
by a solution must be tailored to support rendering in such digital geospa-
tial environments.
5.1.6 Components and Structure
At the beginning of this chapter we described a solution as an entity re-
sponsible for 1) reading risk data, 2) converting risk data into risk visualiza-
tions, and 3) communicating risk visualizations to the user interacting with the
solution (see Figure 5.1). In this section, we expand the notion of what a
solution is, based on the assumptions introduced earlier in Section 5.1.
Drawing on the assumptions made in Section 5.1, we identify 3 internal
components (see Figure 5.2) that a solution should consist of, in order to
fulfill its responsibilities. The first of these components, which we have
chosen to call a risk visualization generator, is responsible for converting
risk data, into visualization data. The second component, referred to as a
risk visualization map is responsible for receiving incident information, and
for communicating the visualization data produced by the risk visualiza-
tion generator to the users, by means of visualizing it in a digital map. The
third internal component, which will facilitate all communication between
the other components (both internal and external), is the risk visualization
controller.
The only external component a solution is dependent on in order to work,
is the entity responsible for supplying the solution with risk data on de-
mand. Without this component, a solution will not have any risk data to
base its visualizations on, making the solution in itself obsolete. However,
this being an external component, we will not dwell any more about its in-
ner workings, neither here or in the remainder of this chapter. Instead, we
will view this component, which we have chosen to call a risk information
generator as a black box, whose only interesting properties include its input
and output.
In Figure 5.2, we illustrate and explain how the 4 components introduced
above interact and communicate with each other in order to produce and
visualize risk information for an incident specified by a user. For each ar-
row in the diagram connecting one component with another, or one com-
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ponent with a user, a number is given, referencing the items in the list
below the diagram. In this list, we provide a detailed description for each
step of the interaction, sorted in the order of occurrence.
5.2 Requirements
Based on the results from the user needs analysis presented in Chapter 4,
and the assumptions described in Section 5.1, this section introduce a set
of requirements towards solutions for visualization of risk. In general, the
aim of these requirements is to clarify what functionality a solution must
support, and what types of data it must be capable of handling and/or
producing, in order to fulfill the needs identified in Chapter 4. Addition-
ally, some requirements are set to make sure a solution conforms to the
constraints enforced by the assumptions presented in Section 5.1.
5.2.1 Data and Expressiveness
In this section we present requirements related to the data handled and/or
produced by a solution. Notably, the data types presented here are often
referenced in the functional requirements introduced later in this section.
When necessary, one might look back at this section for an in-depth speci-
fication of the requirements connected to the various data types.
Risk Information Queries
In order to generate risk data for an incident, a risk information generator
must first be provided with some basic information about the incident. For
the sake of simplicity, we refer to this basic information as a risk information
query. In the list below, we specify what all risk information queries must
contain. Optionally, and advantageously, one might also include other
types of data in a query, such as data describing factors that may affect
risk, or the severity of the incident.
• A risk information query must contain a numerical value representing
the latitude of a point in a geographical space;
• A risk information query must contain a numerical value representing
the longitude of a point in a geographical space;
• A risk information query must contain a description of the nature of an
incident (e.g. wildfire, gas leak);
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Figure 5.2: Complete solution structure
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Risk Data
In the user needs analysis presented in Chapter 4, we identified a poten-
tial need to access a variety of risk information in order to make sound
decision in emergency situations. Based on the results from this analysis,
and drawing on the assumptions made earlier, we can identify a set of re-
quirements describing what information risk data must contain, in order to
provide users with the information they need. To describe these require-
ments, we refer to risk data as a collection of risk information objects, where
each object holds information about a certain risk. In the list below, we
specify what all risk information objects must contain.
• A risk information object must contain a description of risk value (i.e.
the product of consequence and likelihood related to the given risk);
• A risk information object must contain a description of risk conse-
quence (i.e. the impact of the unwanted incident associated with
the risk);
• A risk information object must contain a description of risk likelihood
(i.e. the likelihood of the unwanted incident associated with the risk
occurring);
• A risk information object must contain a description of the asset at
stake for the given risk (e.g. life and health, forest).
• A risk information object must contain a description of risk indicators
(i.e. the underlying factors affecting risk (e.g. wind, temperature));
• A risk information object must contain a description of the physical
object posing the risk (e.g. house, forest area, gas tank).
• A risk information object must contain one or more coordinates de-
scribing the location/extent of the physical object posing the risk.
In addition to a collection of risk information objects, risk data must also
include information about the incident the risk information is to be associ-
ated with. In accordance with the assumptions made earlier, this incident
information must include the following pieces of data:
• Risk data must contain a coordinate representing the location where
the related incident occurred.
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• Risk data must contain a set of coordinates representing the area af-
fected by the related incident.
• Risk data must contain a description of the related incidents’ type
(e.g. wildfire, gas leak).
Visualization Data
To fulfill the needs identified in Chapter 4, visualizations must have the
ability to express all types of information contained within risk data. Ad-
ditionally, visualizations must also conform to a number of requirements
enforced by the assumptions presented in Section 5.1. First and foremost,
based on the assumption that visualizations will be viewed on both hand-
held equipment and normal PCs, all visualizations must be scalable to
support different display sizes and resolutions. Furthermore, to afford ef-
ficient interaction with graphical elements on touch screens, all clickable
graphical elements must have a size equal to or larger than 30x30 pixels,
as suggested in [53]. To describe requirements towards visualizations, we
will refer to a visualization as a collection of risk visualization objects, where
each object holds a visual representation of a risk information object. In the
list below, we specify requirements towards risk visualization objects.
• A risk visualization object must consist of or represent graphical ele-
ments (e.g. shapes, diagrams) and attributes (e.g. color, size, text)
that conform to the following requirements:
– support scalability for viewing on displays sizes equal to or
larger than 4 inches;
– support scalability for viewing on display resolutions equal to
or larger than 480x800 pixels;
– only make use of colors included in an 18 bit color range;
– only make use of elements with a size equal to or larger than
30x30 pixels;
• A risk visualization object must be capable of expressing and commu-
nicating the following variables:
– risk value (i.e. product of likelihood and consequence);
– risk consequence (i.e. the impact of the unwanted incident as-
sociated with the risk);
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– risk likelihood (i.e. the likelihood of the unwanted incident as-
sociated with the risk occurring);
– risk asset (i.e. the asset at stake for the given risk (e.g. life and
health, forest));
– risk indicator (i.e. the underlying factors affecting risk);
– location/physical extent of the physical object posing risk;
– nature of the physical object posing risk (e.g. house, gas tank);
In addition to the above, a visualization must also be capable of ex-
pressing and communicating information about the incident the risk visu-
alization objects are to be associated with, including the following:
• Incident location (i.e. the location where the incident occurred);
• Incident area (i.e. the extent of the area affected by the incident);
• Incident type (i.e. the type of incident that occurred (e.g. wildfire));
5.2.2 Risk Visualization Generator
The risk visualization generator is responsible for converting risk data into
risk visualizations. Based on the structure presented in Figure 5.2, and the
assumptions introduced in Section 5.1, the list below describes what func-
tionality a risk visualization generator must support. Notice that the require-
ments in the list refer to the data types described in Section 5.2.1.
• A risk visualization generator must be capable of receiving risk data
from a risk visualization controller.
• A risk visualization generator must be capable of converting risk data
into visualization data.
• A risk visualization generator must be capable of sending visualization
data to a risk visualization controller.
5.2.3 Risk Visualization Controller
As shown in Figure 5.2, the risk visualization controller is the component re-
sponsible for handling all communication between both the internal com-
ponents of a solution, and the external components it depends on. In the
list below, we specify a detailed list of requirements describing what func-
tionality a risk visualization controller must support.
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• A risk visualization controller must be capable of receiving a risk infor-
mation query from a risk visualization map.
• A risk visualization controller must be capable of sending a risk infor-
mation query to a risk information generator.
• A risk visualization controller must be capable of receiving a risk data
from a risk information generator.
• A risk visualization controller must be capable of sending risk data to a
risk visualization generator.
• A risk visualization controller must be capable of receiving visualization
data from a risk visualization generator.
• A risk visualization controller must be capable of sending a set of visu-
alization data to a risk visualization map.
5.2.4 Risk Visualization Map
A risk visualization map is responsible for handling input from- and output
to the users of the solution. In particular, this includes 1) receiving data
describing incidents from users, and 2) communicating visualizations to
the users by rendering these in a digital geospatial environment. In the
list below, we specify a detailed list of requirements describing what func-
tionality a risk visualization map must support.
• A risk visualization map must be capable of receiving a risk information
query from a user.
• A risk visualization map must be capable of sending a risk information
query to a risk visualization controller.
• A risk visualization map must be capable of receiving visualization data
from a risk visualization controller.
• A risk visualization map must be capable of rendering visualization data
in a digital geospatial environment.
• A risk visualization map must be capable of controlling what parts of
a visualization that are visible based on input from the user.
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In this chapter we introduced a number of assumptions describing when,
where and by whom a solution will be used, which technology it will run
on, and what components it will consist of. Based on these assumptions,
we then moved on to develop a set of requirements describing what func-
tionality a solution for visualization of risk must support, and how the
solution should behave, in order to fulfill the needs identified in Chapter
4. In the next chapter, we utilize the requirements developed here to build
a first proposal towards a solution for visualization of risk.
Chapter 6
Risk Visualization Solution
In this chapter we introduce a lightweight proposal towards a solution for
visualization of risk. Despite the fact that the requirements specification in
Chapter 5 contains several technical requirements, this proposal focuses
solely on the design and expressiveness of visualizations produced by a
solution, (see requirements towards visualization data in Section 5.2.1).
This way, we aim to determine how risk and incident data should be visu-
alized before we begin a technical implementation, and thus avoid wasting
time implementing a solution that may produce incomprehensible visual-
izations. The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.1 we describe
how an incident along with its affected area is visualized in a map. In
Section 6.2 we define how objects of risk are visualized within this area.
6.1 Incident and Affected Area
An incident is represented by an icon placed on the map. While the icon
itself represents the incident type (e.g. fire, gas leak), its position on the
map represents the location where the incident occurred. The only type of
incidents included in this proposal, is fire incident, represented by the icon
shown in Figure 6.1. The position of this fire icon in the map represents
where the fire incident occurred. The incident area (i.e. the area affected
by the incident) is denoted by means of a blue outline representing the
outer boundaries of this area. Hence, the area affected by the incident is
the area contained within this blue outline (see Figure 6.1). All risk objects,
as described in Section 6.2, are located within the incident area.
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Figure 6.1: Representation of incident and affected area
6.2 Risk Objects
A risk object represents a physical object that as a result of the incident that
has occurred, pose risk to an asset. Graphically, a risk object is denoted
by an element positioned directly on the map where the physical object it
represents is located. The graphical elements used to represent a risk ob-
ject may differ depending on the type of object that is being represented, as
explained in Section 6.2.1. Furthermore, the graphical attributes applied
to these elements may differ depending on which risk level the object is as-
sociated with, as described in Section 6.2.2. By clicking on a risk object, an
information balloon is displayed (see Figure 6.5), holding additional infor-
mation about the risks’ consequence, likelihood, and underlying factors.
The representations of consequence, likelihood and underlying factors are
explained in Section 6.2.3, Section 6.2.4 and Section 6.2.5.
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6.2.1 Risk Object Type
By the term risk object type we refer to what kind of physical object that is
being represented. In this proposal we implement three types of risk ob-
jects, including buildings, forest areas and explosive hazards. A building
is represented by means of a building icon and a three dimensional poly-
gon holding the shape of the building. In cases where a group of buildings
is positioned in close proximity of each other in the map, these buildings
are denoted by one building cluster icon, minimizing the number of icons
displayed simultaneously. The aim of clustering icons is to reduce clutter
in the visualization, and to minimize the cognitive load it put on its view-
ers. Furthermore, an explosive hazard is denoted by an explosive hazard
icon, while a forest area is represented solely by means of a two dimen-
sional polygon holding the shape of the area. The icons and polygons
used to represent various risk object types can be seen in Figure 6.2 and
Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.2: Representation of risk object types (icons)
Figure 6.3: Representation of risk object types (polygons)
6.2.2 Risk Object Risk Level
Risk levels are used to classify and describe risks in terms of their risk
value (i.e. product of likelihood and consequence). Instead of having dif-
ferent visual representations for all possible risk values, we split the risk
value range in four parts corresponding to four distinct risk levels includ-
ing low, moderate, high and catastrophic. Respectively, these risk levels are
represented by the colors green, yellow, orange and red. The rationale for
using these four colors to represent different risk levels is based on the
findings of [58], showing that there is a hierarchy in different colors abil-
ity to represent risk, where red is perceived as representing a higher risk
than yellow, which is perceived as representing a higher risk than green.
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To show which risk level a risk object belongs to, all risk objects are col-
orized according to their respective risk level. As an example of this, a red
building icon signifies catastrophic risk, while a green forest area polygon
signifies low risk. The representation of risk level are further explained
and exemplified in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Representation of risk object risk level using color
6.2.3 Risk Object Consequence
The consequence (i.e. “the impact of an unwanted incident on an asset” [52] )
related to a risk object is represented by means of an asset description, and
a consequence value connected to a meter-diagram (see Figure 6.5). An asset
description provides a textual account of the assets nature (i.e. the charac-
ter of the asset), and have thus no fixed set of values. The meter-diagram
denotes consequence severity by pointing an arrow at different positions
and colors on the diagram depending on the severity. The color-scale used
to represent different severity degrees is equivalent with the scale used to
represent risk levels (see 6.4). Hence, low severity for example, is rep-
resented by a green color, while very high severity is denoted by a red
color. The consequence value provides a textual account of the consequence
severity in terms of how dangerous the unwanted incident is for the asset
at stake, taking one of the following forms; “not dangerous”, “dangerous”,
“very dangerous” or “catastrophic”. For a short overview and example of the
representation of consequence, see Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Representation of risk object consequence
6.2.4 Risk Object Likelihood
The likelihood related to a risk object (i.e. the probability that the un-
wanted incident will occur), is represented by means of a likelihood-value
connected to a meter-diagram (see Figure 6.6). Apart from the likelihood-
value, the meter-diagram utilized to represent likelihood is equivalent
with the meter-diagram used to represent consequence. In this case how-
ever, the pointer of the meter-diagram denotes how likely it is that the un-
wanted incident will occur, going from the lowest degree of likelihood
represented by the green part of the diagram, to the highest degree of like-
lihood represented by the red part of the diagram. The likelihood value,
which provides a textual account of the likelihood, is located next to the
arrow in the meter-diagram, taking one of the following forms; “Unlikely”,
“Less likely”, ”Possible“, “Likely”, or “Very likely”. For a short overview and
example of the representation of likelihood, see Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: Representation of risk object likelihood
6.2.5 Risk Object Underlying Factors
The likelihood for- and the consequence of, an unwanted incident, are al-
ways affected by a number of underlying factors. As an example of this,
the likelihood for a wildfire spreading to a house may be affected by fac-
tors such as wind direction and wind strength, while the consequence of
a house burning down may be affected by factors such as the size of the
building and the number of people living there.
In order to communicate underlying factor information for risk objects, a
factors tab is provided in each information balloon, holding zero or more
factor descriptions. Each factor description consist of two parts, including (in
the order of appearance) a description of factor type (e.g. Wind strength,
Temperature), and a description of factor value (e.g. 8 m/s, 30° Celsius). The
factor type and factor value are presented on the same line, separated by a
colon (:). For a short overview and example of the representation of un-
derlying factors, see Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Representation of risk objects’ underlying factors
In this chapter, we introduced a first proposal towards a solution for
visualization of risk, focusing mainly on the design and expressiveness
of visualizations produced by a solution. In the next chapter, we eval-
uate the solution for visualization of risk presented in the course of this
chapter, aiming to determine what aspects of the solution that works well,
what aspects that are problematic, and how the solution can be improved.
As a result of the evaluation, we find that several aspects of this solution
do not work as intended, and that the solution has a large potential for
improvement.
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Chapter 7
First Risk Visualization Solution
Evaluation
In order to evaluate the solution for visualization of risk introduced in
Chapter 7, we invited 5 fire lieutenants from a local fire department to
take part in an evaluation workshop. The main goal of the workshop was
to investigate how our risk visualizations prototypes were interpreted by
representatives from the target group. In general, the results showed that
some aspects of the visualizations worked well, while other aspects were
problematic and need to be redesigned. Several suggestions for improve-
ments were also identified. In this chapter, we provide an in-depth de-
scription of how the evaluation was conducted, along with a detailed pre-
sentation and discussion of our findings. First and foremost however, we
start off by clarifying the aim of the study.
7.1 Aim of the Study
The overall aim of the study was to evaluate our proposed solution for
visualization of risk together with representatives from the target group,
and through this evaluation develop an understanding of: (1) what as-
pects of our solutions that work well, (2) what aspects that does not work
well, and (3) how the identified issues may be improved. In particular, we
wanted to compare the participants’ interpretation of the visualizations
with the intended interpretation, as specified in the visualization seman-
tics in Chapter 6. To help guide the comparison, we defined a set of task
scenarios, where each scenario was related to fulfilling one or more of the
previously identified needs (see Chapter 4). For each of these scenarios,
we wanted to identify inconsistencies between the interpretation of the
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participants and the indented interpretation, understand why the iden-
tified inconsistencies occurred, and through this understanding develop
suggestions as to how the visualizations may be improved.
In addition to evaluating certain aspects of the visualizations, we were
also interested in collecting the participants’ general opinion about the
solutions, not only with regards to strengths, weaknesses and improve-
ments, but also in relation to utilizing the solutions in real-life situations.
7.2 Method
The study was based on a walkthrough design, which generally involves
”walking through a task with the system and noting problematic usability fea-
tures” [49]. In particular, the design was inspired both by the pluralistic
walkthrough technique, where participants are asked to write down what
they believe will be the next step in a given task scenario [49], and the
group-based expert walkthrough technique, which is “particularly developed
to enable work-domain experts to serve as evaluators“ [12]. The rationale for
drawing on different walkthrough techniques in our evaluation design,
was due not only to the fact that our object of evaluation was not a stan-
dard window application, but also to our scarce amount of resources, and
the highly domain specific application area of our solutions. By combin-
ing the two techniques, we ended up with a walkthrough design where
work-domain experts were utilized as evaluators, and where issues were
identified first and foremost based on the evaluators interpretation of the
visualizations.
7.2.1 Participants
A sample of 5 fire lieutenants participated in the study. The participants
were chosen based on a convenience sampling strategy [57], by asking
the fire chief at a local fire department to forward a request to take part
in the study to the fire lieutenants working in his department. Coming
from a small fire department, all 5 participants knew each other well, and
were used to working together. Nevertheless, drawing on the nature of
the study, the collegiality between participants seemed to be more advan-
tageous than damaging for the results, as participants were used to having
discussions and thus were (seemingly) less afraid to speak their mind.
According to the participants themselves, fire lieutenants from small fire
departments often have more breadth and less depth in their competence
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than fire lieutenants from larger fire departments who often specialize in
certain types of equipment and/or know-how. Based on these claims,
there might be a difference between our findings in this study, compared to
what we would find if we conducted the same study with fire lieutenants
from a larger fire department.
The size of the sample was determined first and foremost based on our
choice of research method. According to [49], a walkthrough evaluation
usually consist of 5-6 evaluators. This claim is also consistent within group-
based expert walkthroughs, as described by [12]. It should also be noted that
one of the participants were on duty during the meeting, and thus had to
run back and forth to answer the telephone. As a result, this participant
was only present during certain parts of the evaluation.
7.2.2 Materials
To evaluate our visualizations, we visualized 3 incident scenarios of vari-
ous severity, including (1) a detached home fire (see Figure 7.1), (2) a fire
in a larger building (see Figure 7.2), and (3) a forest fire (see Figure 7.3).
In an effort to maintain the ecological validity of our evaluation, each in-
cident scenario was discussed thoroughly with the fire chief at the same
fire department, to make sure the scenarios were realistic. Additionally, 6
task scenarios were developed, based on the various aspects of the visu-
alizations that we wanted to evaluate. Each task scenario consisted of an
overall goal, and one or two questions that were used to present the task
scenario to the participants. A description of the task scenarios is included
in table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Evaluation task scenarios
No. Description
1 Understanding incident location and affected area.
2 Understanding risk object types (e.g. building, explosive haz-
ard).
3 Understanding risk-level related to risk objects.
4 Understanding consequence related to risk objects.
5 Understanding likelihood related to risk objects.
6 Understanding underlying factors related to risk objects.
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Figure 7.1: Incident Scenario 1: Detached home fire
Figure 7.2: Incident Scenario 2: Fire in a larger building
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Figure 7.3: Incident Scenario 3: Forest fire
In order to present the task scenarios and the visualization solutions to
the participants, we put together a PowerPoint presentation showing the
visualizations and questions related to each task scenario, along with a
discussion slide for each scenario. Additionally, to provide consistency
across the feedback from participants, and to assist later analysis, a feed-
back report sheet was utilized (see Appendix A). This sheet worked as a
template for the evaluators written feedback for each task scenario, and
consisted of printouts of the visualizations, the question(s) related to each
task scenario (e.g. “What area may be affected by the fire?”), and a summary
section including form fill-in sections for (1) Strengths, (2) Weaknesses, (3)
Suggestions for improvements and (4) Other comments.
The evaluation was conducted in a private meeting room at the fire station.
A digital audio recorder was used to record audio from the meeting, and
a projector screen was utilized to present the previously described Pow-
erPoint presentation to the participants. An informed consent regarding
privacy and use of data collected in the evaluation, approved by the Nor-
wegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), was handed out and filled in
by the participants ahead of the meeting, in agreement with NSD regula-
tions.
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7.2.3 Procedure
The walkthrough session lasted approximately 2 hours, and consisted of
3 main parts. In the first part of the session we explained the main idea
behind our solutions for visualization of risk, typical use case scenarios,
and what we wanted to achieve in the evaluation session. In the second
part, which was the central part of the evaluation, we stepped through
each of the 6 task scenarios described in table 7.1. For each task scenario,
the same procedure was applied, consisting of the following 5 steps:
1. Presenting the task scenario to the participants.
2. Asking the participants to fill in the feedback report sheet.
3. Asking the participants to present their feedback to the rest of the
group.
4. Explaining the visualizations semantics related to the given task sce-
nario.
5. Discussing the feedback.
In the third, and last part of the meeting, we encouraged a summariz-
ing discussion, where the participants had a chance to address other is-
sues concerning our solutions, state their opinion regarding what they had
seen, or ask any question they might have.
7.2.4 Analysis
Before the real analysis work could begin, the audio recordings and feed-
back report sheets were transcribed. Following the transcription, the data
was then categorized according to which task scenario the various data
parts were relevant for. Data that was relevant for several task scenarios
was put in each of the related task scenario categories. Data that did not
fit into any of the specific task scenario categories was sorted into an ad-
ditional category containing “miscellaneous” data, as they might still con-
tain valuable information. The data in each category was then analyzed by
means of open coding, which is an analysis technique often utilized within
the Grounded Theory framework [51]. According to its developers, open cod-
ing is the process of “breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing,
and categorizing data” [51]. It is up to the analyst to determine the level of
granularity (e.g. words, sentences, paragraphs, pages) at which the data
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should be analyzed. For our analysis, the data in each category was exam-
ined on sentence level, which means that each sentence (written or spo-
ken), was categorized and interpreted according to what aspect of the task
scenario its content was relevant for. Following this analysis, a summary
of the findings for each task scenario was produced, as presented in the
following section.
7.3 Findings and Discussion
In this section we provide a summary and discussion of our findings for
each task scenario. Additionally, we also present and discuss other mis-
cellaneous findings that are not specifically related to any of the task sce-
narios.
7.3.1 Task Scenario 1: Understanding incident location and
affected area
In the first part of this task scenario, we asked the participants to deter-
mine, based on the visualizations in the map, where the incident occurred
in each incident scenario. In general, the participants interpreted the in-
cident symbol as it was supposed to be interpreted, namely to represent
the incident location. There were however, differences between the partic-
ipants with regards to how much meaning they assigned to the position of
the symbol in the map. While some participants interpreted the position
of the symbol to represent the exact location where the incident occurred,
even within the boundaries of buildings (e.g. “the fire started in the middle
of the building”), other participants interpreted the position of the symbol
to represent a less exact location (e.g. “the fire started somewhere in the build-
ing”). In relation to this, one of the participants remarked that it was hard
to say exactly where in the house the fire started, although it was clear for
him that the fire started in the house.
Although it might seem quite harmless that some viewers may interpret
the incident symbol to represent a more accurate position of the incident
than what it actually does, it could in the worst case scenario lead to
wrong prioritization of resources. As an example of this, imagine a sce-
nario where a fire has occurred in a large building, and where the fire
symbol has been positioned at one end of the building even though we
are not really sure where the fire actually has occurred. If the given opera-
tive leader in this case interpreted the symbol and its location to represent
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the exact location of the incident, he or she might end up deploying re-
sources on the wrong part of the building. To minimize this problem, we
suggest that the incident symbol should always be positioned in the middle
of the element (e.g. house polygon) where the incident occurred, as long
as the exact location of the incident is unknown. In cases where the exact
location of the incident (within the boundaries of an element) is known,
the incident symbol may be positioned on this exact location within the
element (e.g. the northern part of a building).
In the second part of the first task scenario, we asked the participants to
determine, based on the visualizations in the map, what area that is or
that could be, affected by the fire. Unfortunately, the participants mis-
understood this question to mean that they should utilize their own ex-
pertise to produce an estimate of this area, instead of just interpreting the
visualization. One of the participants however, asked directly if the blue
outline was supposed to represent the area that it was likely that the fire
may spread to. Although some of the participants seemed to agree when
this question was confirmed, it is generally unclear whether or not the
representation of the incident area was intuitively interpreted as the area
affected by the incident. Nevertheless, the participants had no problems
referring to the incident area in the remainder of the evaluation, when they
had been explained how to interpret the blue colored outline.
7.3.2 Task Scenario 2: Understanding risk object type
In the first part of the second task scenario, we asked the participants to
determine, what types of risk objects that existed within the incident area.
For the most part, the participants interpreted the various graphical ele-
ments correctly, without much difficulty. All participants identified build-
ings and areas of forest, and three out of four specifically identified the
explosive hazard object in incident scenario 2 (see Figure 7.2). However,
although the general semantics of the graphical elements seemed to be
interpreted correctly by the participants, there were differences between
how the participants assigned additional meaning to the elements. While
one participant referred to a certain building as a cabin, another partici-
pant referred to the same building as a house. Another example of this is
shown in the following citation, where one of the participants while pro-
viding a summary of his thoughts regarding objects within the incident
area, refers to several different building types (translated from Norwe-
gian):
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“In the first picture there’s only a detached home and greenery. In the
second, there are industrial halls and explosives. In the third, there
are large areas of forest, cabins, and other buildings.”
The problem with having participants assigning additional “made up” se-
mantics to the graphical elements in the visualizations, is that these addi-
tional semantics may cause viewers to interpret the visualization wrongly.
As an example of this, a viewer that interprets a building icon to represent
a cabin may infer less risk to the building than a viewer that interprets the
icon to represent a house. To bridge this problem of ambiguity, one solu-
tion would be to provide a finer level of granularity in our visualizations,
where we not only differentiate between various classes of physical objects
(e.g. buildings, forests, roads), but also between subclasses of these classes
(e.g. buildings = houses, cabins, industrial factories). This finer level of
granularity could easily be achieved by utilizing different attributes (e.g.
color, texture) and/or graphical elements (e.g. icons, shapes) to represent
objects from the various subclasses (e.g. different icons for houses, cabins
and factories). However, when introducing a larger collection of different
graphical elements into the visualization, one also increases the cognitive
load that the visualization puts on its viewers.
Another issue, was that the icon utilized to represent an explosive hazard,
were interpreted differently across participants. While three participants
interpreted the icon as intended, the fourth participant interpreted the icon
to represent explosives (i.e. dynamite), which is something that (according
to the participants) is quite unusual to deal with, even for fire lieutenants.
In the second part of the task scenario, we asked the participants to de-
termine what might happen in the various incident scenarios, as a result
of the incident. In some cases, the participants gave vague answers, or
pointed out additional dangers that we had not accounted for ourselves.
The vague answering might be a result of the question itself being vague
and unspecific. Additionally, some of the participants mentioned that it
was difficult to answer the question, as they did not know the underly-
ing details affecting the situation (e.g. wind strength, type of explosives).
Despite these issues, it should be highlighted that the participants in the
majority of the cases interpreted the visualizations correctly. Generally,
participants reported that the main danger, in addition to the objects on
the fire site burning down, was that the fire may spread to its surround-
ings, causing buildings and/or forest to burn down, and the explosive
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hazard object to explode.
During the discussion, one of the participants pointed out that the visual-
ization does not tell the viewer how “big” the fire is, making it difficult to
determine what might happen. The participant further explained that in
the occasion of a fire, they usually collect information regarding the size
of the fire through telephone communication with people present on the
fire site, so that they can be better prepared when they arrive on-scene.
Drawing on this, it might be fruitful to incorporate a notion of incident
size/severity into the visualization, not only to increase the validity of
the generated risk information, but also to help viewers gain a better un-
derstanding of the situation and the reasoning behind the generated risk
information. One way of incorporating this incident size/severity repre-
sentation into the visualizations, would be to make use of different symbol
colors and/or sizes to represent different levels of severity (e.g. a larger
fire incident symbol represents a more severe fire than a smaller fire in-
cident symbol). The problem with this approach however, is that a visu-
alization typically only contain one incident symbol, inhibiting the ability
to compare one incident symbol with another. Another considered alter-
native is to use different symbols for different severity degrees. However,
as highlighted earlier, this might lead to an increase in the cognitive load
put on the viewers. As a result, the best solution might be to make use of
a label providing a textual description of the incident size/severity. This
type of solution might also provide a more natural way of representing
this aspect of an incident, as the correct representation of size/severity
may differ between various types of incidents. In additional support of
this solution, [19] suggests that text labels may be used in combination
with graphical elements, to provide the viewer with additional informa-
tion concerning “magnitude or seriousness of risks, unwanted incidents and
more” [19].
7.3.3 Task Scenario 3: Understanding risk-level
In this task scenario we asked the participants to determine risk-level (given
the risk scale low, moderate, high, catastrophic) related to the various points/areas
within the incident area. The first thing that was obvious based on the
feedback from the participants, was that the meaning of the term risk is
highly subjective, and that fire lieutenants are unfamiliar with looking at
risk as the product of likelihood and consequence. While one participant
talked about risk only in terms of the fire personnel (e.g. “small risk to
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personnel”), another participant saw risk as equivalent with what might
happen in the various incident scenarios (e.g. “fire spreading in the detached
home + neighboring building”). A third participant wrote that the risk was
“high if the fire spread to the residential area”.
Despite the fact that participants had completely different opinions re-
garding what risk meant, this does not explain why none of the partici-
pants intuitively interpreted the color-scale utilized in the visualizations
(see Figure 6.4 and Figure 7.3) to have something to do with risk-level.
According to studies such as [58], there is a hierarchy in different colors
ability to represent risk (as perceived by the general public), where red
is perceived as representing a higher risk than yellow, which is perceived
as representing a higher risk than green. Based on those findings, par-
ticipants should, averagely connect low risk-levels to green coloring, and
high risk-levels to red coloring. Other explanations of our findings, in-
clude that the task scenario in itself was not interpreted correctly, or that
the way color was represented in our visualizations simply was not clear
enough. With regards to the latter, problems could have occurred due to
the fact that the map background itself had strong coloring, or that the col-
ors in the visualizations were lightly transparent. Although we cannot be
certain that any of these factors did have a significant impact on the inter-
pretation of risk-level, it is obvious that the color-scale utilized to repre-
sent risk-level would have had a stronger visual expression and a higher
degree of clarity, if the underlying map were less colorful. However, by
excluding colors from a map, one might also eradicate some parts of the
semantic expressiveness found in the map. As many maps make heavy
use of colors to communicate information, it would be inappropriate and
potentially dangerous to remove coloring from the underlying map, espe-
cially as our solution is tailored to support basically any type of map.
After being explained how the visualization were to be read (i.e. that the
different colors represented different risk levels), and that risk is the prod-
uct of consequence and likelihood, one participant commented that they
probably would have interpreted the visualization differently if they were
told about the use of colors beforehand, and that their answers were based
on the tools that they were using on a day to day basis. Drawing on this,
it might not be the case that our use of colors for representing risk lev-
els was difficult to understand. Instead, the feedback may only show that
fire lieutenants are unfamiliar with the concept of risk itself (at least as the
product of consequence and likelihood), and that they simply were look-
ing for the wrong things. Based on this, and studies such as [58] showing
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that the use of color is a good way of representing various levels of risk, we
do not suggest changing the current representation of risk-level. Instead,
we believe that this aspect of our visualizations is in great need of further
investigation.
In hindsight, we also believe that it would have been easier for the par-
ticipants to understand the task scenario if we instead of asking the par-
ticipants to assign risk-levels in general, rather asked them to assign risk-
levels in relation to a specific asset (e.g. life and health).
7.3.4 Task Scenario 4: Understanding risk consequence
In this task scenario we asked the participants to interpret the content in
the Consequence tab in the information balloon (see Figure 6.5). Based on
the feedback from the participants, some parts of the consequence infor-
mation worked well, while other parts seemed to be problematic. In gen-
eral, the participants seemed to have little problems understanding the
main part, namely that the meter diagrams represented the danger related
to the asset described by the label connected with the meter diagram (e.g.
a meter diagram with an arrow pointing at red, with a label ’Life and health’
above the diagram, means that there is a very high danger to the asset life
and health).
One problem however, was that the participants had different opinions re-
garding what point or area the content of the information balloon applied
to. While some of the participants interpreted the content of the balloon
to apply to the whole incident area (the area contained within the blue
outline), other participants interpreted the content as related only to the
location the information balloon pointed at. In comparison, the content
in the information balloon was supposed to be interpreted to apply to the
graphical element in which the information balloon points at (e.g. the ex-
plosive hazard object in the second incident scenario and the yellow forest
polygon in the third incident scenario). To clarify what point or area the
content of the information balloon applies to, it might be fruitful to high-
light this point or area when an information balloon is visible. There are
many ways in which this could be achieved. One type of highlighting,
would be to simply change the color of the element. Another alternative
is to add an outline around the element.
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Another identified issue was that the participants were confused re-
garding what the labels connected with the arrow on the meter diagrams
were supposed to mean. As one participant put it while talking about
incident scenario 3 (see Figure 7.3) (translated from Norwegian):
“I can understand the arrows, but not the text ... I cannot understand
what ’dangerous’ have to do there ... The way I see it, there’s not
much of value there, as the arrow is pointed at yellow.. Where does
’dangerous’ come in?”
The answer to the participants question above would be that the label
’dangerous’ was supposed to mean that if the fire spread to the given area,
this would have dangerous consequences for material values. However,
as clarified by the participant above, the word ’dangerous’ may not be a
good word to describe consequences. Additionally, the participants were
also puzzled by the fact that the meter diagram labels differed from the
labels utilized on the risk level legend, as both the legend and the me-
ter diagram made use of the same color scale. Some of the participants
even discarded the consequence labels in their written feedback, by us-
ing ’moderate’ and ’catastrophic’ to describe the consequences, instead of
’dangerous’ and ’very dangerous’. Several participants highlighted this
issue during the discussion, as exemplified below (translated from Nor-
wegian):
“When it comes to material values, the arrow is pointing at ’moder-
ate’ if you use the one (the legend) on the right hand side, but up there
(in the information balloon) it says ’dangerous’, which is different..”
To solve the issues regarding the labeling of the meter diagrams, one par-
ticipant suggested simply removing the labels, arguing that the colors
themselves would be sufficient to communicate the consequence value.
Another participant however, vouched for keeping the labels. Based on
studies such as [54] (as cited by [19]), showing that text in the form of dig-
its, letters and words are more efficient than colors and shapes in terms
of processing speed and less demanding in terms of subjective workload,
keeping the labels seems to be the best alternative. However, if the labels
are to be kept, it is obvious that the wording of the labels must be changed,
as the consequence-value-scale utilized (e.g. dangerous, very dangerous)
did not make sense for the viewers. Instead of describing consequence
in terms of how much danger the given risk pose to an asset, we suggest
making use of labels similar to those used to represent risk-level in the
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representation of consequence-value, as this seemed to be a more natural
way to describe consequence for the participants. Additionally, to remove
the ambiguity caused by the use of the same color-scale to represent both
risk-level and consequence, we suggest removing the meter-diagram as
a whole from the consequence representation. Another observation from
the evaluation was that participants generally did not seem to associate
the consequence information with a certain event or incident, even though
this is necessary in order to make sense and use of the consequence infor-
mation. In light of this, we suggest that a description of the associated
event should be added to the consequence information, making it possi-
ble for viewers to connect the latter with the former.
7.3.5 Task Scenario 5: Understanding risk likelihood
In this task scenario, we asked the participants to interpret the content in
the Likelihood tab in the information balloon (see Figure 6.6). Based on the
feedback from the participants, we found several issues with the way the
likelihood was represented. First and foremost, there seemed to be split
opinions among the participants regarding what type of happening/event
the likelihood were to be associated with. While some participants inter-
preted likelihood in relation to undesirable events that may occur (e.g.
spread of fire, explosion), other participants interpreted it to describe how
likely it was that the fire would have catastrophic consequences.
If viewers do not understand what undesired event the likelihood is to
be associated with, the likelihood information itself becomes redundant.
Furthermore and even worse: If viewers interpret the likelihood infor-
mation to be associated with an event that it is not actually associated
with, wrong decisions might be made. To solve this problem, and to
make it clear for the viewers what (undesired) event the likelihood is to
be associated with, it might be fruitful to add a description of the event
(e.g. explosion, burn down) to the likelihood information. This way, like-
lihood would be directly associated with the event of which it denotes
likelihood for, providing the viewers with a more natural representation,
where likelihood is clearly associated with an unwanted incident. Com-
pared with the evaluated version of the visualizations, where unwanted
incidents are described through a label positioned on the top of the infor-
mation balloon (see Figure 6.6) and thus to a certain degree disconnected
from the likelihood-value itself, a new version of the visualizations should
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communicate and describe the unwanted incident in direct relation to the
likelihood-value (e.g. Explosion: Very likely).
Additionally, in similarity with the findings in task scenario 4, there were
different opinions regarding what point or area the likelihood informa-
tion applied to. While some of the participants interpreted the likelihood
information to hold true for the whole incident area, other participants
interpreted the information as related only to the element the informa-
tion balloon pointed at. In accordance with Section 7.3.4 above, this issue
might also be improved by highlighting (e.g. change the color of the area,
add an outline around the area) the area that the likelihood information is
supposed to apply to, whenever the likelihood information is visible.
Furthermore, the use of the color-scale in the meter diagram seemed to do
more harm than good, as several participants connected the color-scale to
risk level, and thus started to mix risk into their interpretation of likeli-
hood. To exemplify this, one of the participants interpreted the informa-
tion balloon in the third incident scenario (see Figure 7.3) to mean that
there was a “moderate likelihood that it will end catastrophically”, while an-
other participant interpreted the information balloon in the second inci-
dent scenario (see Figure 7.2) to mean that it was “very likely that the fire will
have catastrophic consequences”. Based on this we first and foremost sug-
gest removing the color-scale from the likelihood representation. How-
ever, by removing the color-scale, one also remove a substantial part of
the meter-diagrams’ expressiveness. As a result, we suggest also remov-
ing the meter-diagram as a whole from the representation, and only make
use of text labels to communicate likelihood.
7.3.6 Task Scenario 6: Understanding underlying factors
In this task scenario, we asked the participants to interpret the content in
the Factors tab in the information balloon (see Figure 6.7). In most cases,
the factor information was interpreted correctly. The participants were not
only capable of describing in detail what the various factors along with
their assigned values meant, but also how these factors may affect the sit-
uation. In relation to improvements of the design, one of the participants
suggested that it should be possible to extract more information about the
factor gas type, as fire lieutenants not always had much knowledge about
various types of gas. A quotation from the participant is included below
(translated from Norwegian):
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“You get the facts, that it’s propane.. but if it was a more difficult gas
type, it wouldn’t really tell you much.. What if you could click where
it says propane, and get more information about it?”
As suggested in the quotation above, additional factor information may be
provided by making it possible to click on a given factor value to bring up
more information about it. Although the quotation strictly concerns gas
type information, a similar need for additional factor information might
also apply to other types of factors. The general point is that as long as the
factor value itself might be difficult to understand, additional information
about the value should be available. Otherwise, the factor value might
cause more confusion than enlightenment.
Furthermore, the participants also seemed to interpret the underlying fac-
tor information in relation to the consequence- and likelihood information
they were presented with earlier in task scenario 4 and 5. One of the par-
ticipants even pointed out that there had to be something missing in the
map, as he could not understand how the likelihood could be that low,
based on the underlying factors. As a result, the participant started think-
ing about other factors that could have affected the likelihood, such as the
contour of the terrain, which was not included in the map.
The feedback from this latter participant also highlights a vulnerable as-
pect of the general idea behind our solutions. On one hand, for our so-
lutions to be of any use, operative leaders must maintain a certain degree
of trust towards the validity of our solutions output. On the other hand,
as our solutions may produce invalid output, operative leaders must also
maintain a certain degree of doubt, and question the validity of the out-
put. If this balance of trust and distrust is disrupted, a solution might in
the worst case end up doing more harm than good.
To help operative leaders maintain a well-balanced degree of credibility
towards the information they are presented with in the visualizations, it
might be fruitful to incorporate a notion of uncertainty, in our visualiza-
tions. By communicating how certain or uncertain we are regarding the
validity of the visualized information, we might also increase the capa-
bility of the viewers to determine whether or not the information should
be trusted. As discussed in Section 2.5.2, there are a number of empiri-
cally grounded techniques for visualizing uncertainty. While some studies
suggest the use of texture as a graphical attribute for representing uncer-
tainty [7, 3], other studies highlight the use of animation [32]. However, if
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we were to make use of these attributes to communicate uncertainty, we
should remember that an additional use of graphical attributes may cause
additional clutter in our visualizations, and an increase in the cognitive
load the visualizations puts on their viewers.
7.3.7 Miscellaneous findings
In this section, we present the findings which were not directly related to
specific task scenarios. For the most part, these findings build upon par-
ticipants’ statements regarding general strengths and weaknesses in our
solution.
First and foremost, there was a lot of skepticism among the participants
regarding how and if our solutions would be usable in a real-life situation.
In particular, it was highlighted that it would be difficult to understand
distance between objects, if the visualizations were scaled down to fit on a
mobile phone display, and that any handheld equipment would have to
be sturdy enough to withstand harsh field conditions. As an alternative to
using handheld equipment, it was suggested that the visualizations could
be displayed on a fixed monitor placed on the dashboard of the fire engine
truck. It was also suggested that visualizations should be readily available
for viewing when the fire squad got seated in the car, instead of having to
specify the details of the incident themselves to bring up the visualiza-
tions.
With regard to strengths, it was highlighted that the visualizations pro-
vided a good overview of the emergency situation and the affected area,
making it possible to form a picture of the situation before arriving on the
incident scene (see quotation below):
“It makes it possible for us to form an image of the incident or fire
on the way out, instead of having to wait until we get there to see
what’s happening.. It’s obvious that it would be a helpful tool, there’s
no doubt about that..”
Drawing on the feedback, some parts of the visualized risk information
seemed to be more valuable than other parts. Specifically, the content in
the information balloon got more attention than the other parts in the vi-
sualizations. In relation to this, one of the participants even pointed out
that the likelihood- and underlying factor information might be the most
valuable (translated from Norwegian):
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“Some of the most important information is what’s written in the
white field (the information balloon). It is just as important with the
underlying factors and the likelihood and.. Maybe that’s the most
important information, not the image..
We also asked the participants about their opinions regarding functional-
ity to prioritize risk information based on risk level. Based on the feed-
back, there seemed to be a mutual agreement across participants that pri-
oritization of risk information could be a beneficial addition to the visu-
alization solution. Several participants argued that only the most critical
risk information should be visible in the start phase of the emergency op-
eration, as this was the most important information, although it should
be possible to add less critical risk information to the visualization, when
needed. One of the participants described this in the following way (trans-
lated from Norwegian):
“Let’s say that this (picture showing only catastrophic risk informa-
tion) is the first picture that pops up, but that you have the ability to
add more information when you have absorbed things and initiated
the first emergency response.”
One of the participants mentioned that it might be dangerous to prioritize
only some parts of the risk information, as the situation may change in
time. For example, if a user for some reason have chosen to view high risks
only (maybe because he have dealt with all the catastrophic risks already),
he may be unaware of catastrophic risks that emerge after the catastrophic
risk information was hidden. To bridge this problem, one would have to
make sure that users that prioritize risk information are somehow made
aware of new emerging risks regardless of what risk-level(s) they have
chosen to prioritize, at least if these new emerging risks have a higher
risk-level than the prioritized information.
7.3.8 Summary
In this section we provide a summary of our findings, including (in accor-
dance with the aim of the study) a brief presentation of 1) what aspects
of our visualizations that worked well, 2) what aspects that were prob-
lematic, and 3) suggestions for improvements. In order to sum up the
findings in a clear and concise manner, a table has been constructed for
each of these three parts, holding the respective parts’ key findings. First,
in Table 7.2, we sum up the aspects of our visualizations that worked well,
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before moving on to problematic aspects in Table 7.3, followed by sugges-
tions for improvements in Table 7.4. For Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, references
to figures exemplifying the various visualization aspects are provided.
Table 7.2: Aspects of the visualization solution that worked well
No. Description Example
1 The visualizations made it possible for viewers to un-
derstand and localize the general position where the
incident occurred.
Figure 6.1
Figure 7.2
2 The visualizations made it possible for viewers to
identify what (general) types of elements that was
located within the boundaries of the incident area
(buildings, forest areas, explosives).
Figure 6.2
Figure 7.3
3 The visualizations made it possible for viewers to
make an approximation of how the situation might
evolve in the future as a result of the incident (i.e. un-
desired events that may occur).
Figure 7.3
4 The visualizations made it possible for viewers to get
an overview of the emergency situation and to “form
a picture” of the incident before arriving on-scene.
Figure 7.3
5 The visualizations made it possible for viewers to un-
derstand underlying factor information related to a
risk object, and to associate this information with the
risks’ consequence and likelihood.
Figure 6.7
6 The visualizations made it possible for viewers to un-
derstand what assets that was at stake for the various
risk objects within the incident area.
Figure 6.5
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Table 7.3: Aspects of the visualization solution which were problematic
No. Problem description Example
1 The visualizations did not make it clear for the view-
ers whether or not the visualized location of the in-
cident was to represent the exact location of the inci-
dent, or if it was only an approximation.
Figure 6.1
Figure 7.2
2 The visualizations did not make it clear for the view-
ers what undesired event the visualized likelihood in-
formation (in the information balloon) was to be asso-
ciated with.
Figure 6.6
3 The visualizations did not make it clear for the view-
ers what undesired event the visualized consequence
information (in the information balloon) was to be as-
sociated with.
Figure 6.5.
4 The visualizations did not provide a sufficient level of
granularity and unambiguity in their representation
of elements within the incident area, as symbols were
sometimes interpreted differently across participants.
Figure 7.3
5 The visualizations were ambiguous in their use of
color to represent meaning. The use of the same
color-scale to represent not only risk-level, but also
likelihood-level and consequence-level, led to incon-
sistent interpretations and confusion among viewers.
Figure 7.3
Figure 6.5
Figure 6.6
6 The visualizations did not make it clear for the view-
ers what point or area the content in an information
balloon was supposed to apply to.
Figure 6.6
7 The visualizations did not provide a clear and intu-
itive representation of the consequence-value related
to a given asset (as described in the information bal-
loon).
Figure 6.5
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Table 7.4: Participants’ suggestions for improving the solution
No. Improvement description
1 The visualizations should be displayed on a fixed monitor posi-
tioned on the dashboard of the fire truck engine, instead of on a
laptop or mobile phone.
2 The visualizations should be readily available for the viewers,
without them having to specify the details of the incident them-
selves before the visualizations can be displayed.
3 The visualizations should incorporate a notion of incident
size/severity, making it easier for viewers to determine what
might happen as a result of the incident.
4 The visualizations should incorporate functionality that makes it
possible to extract additional information about underlying fac-
tor values that are difficult to understand (e.g. gas types) by click-
ing on these factor values.
5 The visualizations should support prioritization of risk informa-
tion in terms of risk-level, and only the most critical risks should
be visible for the viewer’s when they first review the visualiza-
tions.
As one might notice, most of the suggestions in Table 7.4 are in fact un-
related to the issues presented in Table 7.3, and rather concerned with in-
corporating additional functionality, or changing the accessibility of visu-
alizations. The main underlying reason for this result is that participants
simply did not propose many suggestions as to how the identified issues
could be improved, and that some of the issues presented in Table 7.3 were
identified during the analysis, and thus were not properly discussed dur-
ing the walkthrough session. Despite this lack of problem-specific sug-
gestions from the participants, a number of suggestions for rectifying the
identified problems were discussed in the course of this section. A sum-
mary of these suggestions is presented in Table 7.5 below, along with a
reference to the associated problems, as specified in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.5: Discussed suggestions for improving the visualization solution
No. Improvement description Problem
1 Center the incident symbol on the element where the inci-
dent occurred (e.g. a building) when the exact location of
the incident within this element is unknown. Position the
incident symbol on the exact location of the element when
this location is known.
1
2 Add a textual description of the undesired event the likeli-
hood information is to be associated with, (e.g. explosion,
fire) to the representation of likelihood.
2
3 Add a textual description of the undesired event the conse-
quence information is to be associated with, (e.g. explosion,
fire) to the representation of consequence.
3
4 Incorporate a fine-grained granularity of element sym-
bols, where different types of buildings are represented by
means of different symbols (e.g. one type of symbol to rep-
resent a cabin and another type of symbol to represent a
house).
4
5 Remove the color-scale and meter-diagram from the repre-
sentation of likelihood. Instead, utilize only text to describe
likelihood.
5
6 Remove the color-scale meter-diagram from the represen-
tation of consequence. Instead, utilize only text to describe
consequence.
5
7 Highlight what area/point the content of an information
balloon applies to by changing the color of this area or point
and/or by adding an outline around it, whenever an infor-
mation balloon is displayed.
6
8 Change the representation of consequence value (e.g. “dan-
gerous”, “very dangerous”) to reflect the labels describing
risk-levels (e.g. “high”, “catastrophic”).
7
7.4 Threats to Validity
7.4.1 Transferability
An issue related to the transferability of the findings is that the setting of
the study does not approximate the real life situations in which the visual-
izations are meant to be utilized and interpreted. While an emergency sit-
uation is typically characterized by a stressful, attention-demanding and
harsh environment, the evaluation was conducted in the calm atmosphere
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of a meeting room at the fire station. Although the participants were en-
couraged to try and imagine how the visualizations would work in a real
situation, and presented with realistic incident scenarios, it is likely that
there would be a significant difference in how the visualizations are inter-
preted in the study, compared with how they would have been interpreted
in a real life setting.
Another issue of transferability is related to the material used in the study.
In a real-life situation, visualizations would have been displayed on lap-
tops and/or mobile phones. In the study however, visualizations are pre-
sented to the participants by means of paper printouts and a projector
screen. Although the paper printouts approximately matched the size of
a laptop monitor, there could still be great differences with regards to the
graphical quality of the visualizations compared with how they would
look on a laptop screen, due to differences in resolution, back-light and
color-depth. Additionally, it is very likely that the visualizations would be
much more challenging to interpret if they were viewed on a small-scale
screen found in mobile phones, compared with the larger scale visualiza-
tions printouts used in the study.
A third issue connected with the transferability of the study is related to
the representativeness of the participant population that takes part in the
study. The main issue with the participant population, apart from the fact
that it is very small, is that all participants are employed under the same
fire brigade. As work practice, work experience, and tools used for emer-
gency management may vary from one fire brigade to another, it is not cer-
tain that the visualizations would be interpreted in the same way across
fire brigades.
7.4.2 Credibility
One issue connected with the credibility of the findings is that during the
study, we asked participants questions where we told them what they
should look for in the visualizations (e.g. “What area is affected by the inci-
dent?”). As a result, it might have been easier for the participants to iden-
tify what the various elements and attributes of the visualizations were
supposed to represent, compared to if we just asked them what these at-
tributes and elements are supposed to represent without specifying what
they should look for (e.g. “What can you see in the visualization?”). From an-
other perspective however, an effort was made throughout the evaluation
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to ask participants to reflect on their understanding of the various parts of
the visualizations, increasing the credibility of the findings.
Another issue related to the credibility of the findings is that the utilized
walkthrough design where the participants had to present their feedback
to the rest of the participants may have affected the participants ability to
interpret the visualizations, for example due to social nervousness. Sim-
ilarly, some participants might have been reluctant to express their own
opinion if they disagreed with the other participants. Although we did
try to minimize these threats by making the participants write down their
opinion first, and by giving them the possibility to express their opinion to
the rest of the participants, there is always a threat that participants might
have acted differently that they do otherwise, in the type of social setting
utilized in the study. However, drawing on the fact that all the partici-
pants in the study knew each other well, and were used to working in a
very stressful environment, this issue might not have caused any serious
harm to the results.
7.4.3 Confirmability
Drawing on the nature of the study, the data collected, and the small num-
ber of participants, it is not possible to utilize any form of statistical test
to reveal a pattern in the data. Conversely, one must conduct a qualita-
tive analysis on the data resulting from the study, and extract conclusions
based on the results of this analysis. In general, there is nothing wrong
with conducting a qualitative analysis, but a conclusion would typically
stand much stronger if it was based on statistical significance, and data
drawn from a much larger number of participants.
7.5 Conclusion
As this section has shown, some aspects of our solution for risk visualiza-
tion worked well, while other aspects were problematic and need to be
redesigned. Several suggestions for improvements were also identified.
With regards to well-working aspects, the evaluation showed that the risk
visualizations made it possible for users to get an overview of the emer-
gency situation, identify elements located within the incident area, under-
stand underlying factors affecting risk, and what assets that was at stake.
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With regards to problematic aspects, we found that the visualizations did
not provide a clear representation of risk-level, consequence-value nor
what event the likelihood- and consequence information was to be associ-
ated with. Furthermore, our findings showed that the visualizations were
ambiguous with respect to the representation of risk object types, and in
their use of color to represent meaning.
In relation to improvements, participants suggested that the visualizations
should be readily available for viewing when the operative leaders got
seated in the fire engine truck, and that the visualizations should be dis-
played on a fixed monitor on the dashboard of this truck. Additionally,
participants also highlighted the need to incorporate a notion of incident
size/severity in the visualizations, along with functionality to extract ad-
ditional information about underlying factor values, and functionality to
prioritize risk information in terms of risk-level, where only the most crit-
ical risk information should be visible as default.
In this chapter we have evaluated the solution for visualization of risk
introduced in Chapter 6. In the following chapter, we utilize the findings
from this evaluation to develop a revised and improved version of this
solution.
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Chapter 8
Revised Risk Visualization
Solution
In the course of the evaluation of risk visualizations presented in Chapter
7, we identified a number of problematic aspects related to our visualiza-
tions, along with several suggestions for improvements. In light of these
findings, this section present and discuss a proposal for how our first ver-
sion for visualization of risk (see Chapter 6) could be redesigned to rectify
the identified issues and to realize the suggested improvements. It should
be noted that the structure of this proposal is based upon the first version
of risk visualization semantics, and that aspects which remains unchanged
are included in this proposal, as they were in the first. The first part of this
section is thus devoted to explaining how we visualize an incident and
its affected area, while the second part describes how we visualize risk
objects within this area.
8.1 Incident and Affected Area
In conformance with the first version of risk visualization semantics, an
incident is represented by an incident icon placed on the map. While the
symbol of the icon represents the incident type (e.g. fire, gas leak, flood),
its position on the map denotes the location where the incident occurred
(see Figure 8.1). To clarify for the viewer whether or not the incident icon
represents the exact location of the incident, or if it is merely an approxi-
mation, the icon is placed at the center of the graphical element where the
fire occurred in the latter case, and at the exact location within the element
in the former. In this version as in the first, only the incident type fire is
included in the semantics (see Figure 8.1). Fire incidents will thus also be
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used throughout the course of this section to exemplify and explain visu-
alization semantics.
The area affected by an incident, hereby referred to as the incident area, is
denoted by means of a blue outline defining the outer boundaries of this
area directly in the map. The area contained within the blue outline is thus
the area plausibly affected by the incident, while the area on the outside of
the blue outline is unaffected by the incident (see Figure 8.1).
Incident size/severity (i.e. the magnitude of an incident) is represented
by means of a textual description contained within an information bal-
loon (information balloons are described in section 8.2.3) that is displayed
whenever the incident icon has been clicked (see Figure 8.1). As the de-
scription of incident size/severity may differ greatly depending on the
incident, and since we cannot find a standardized scale describing this
factor, we suggest that the textual description should be created manually
as a part of specifying the occurrence of an incident in our solution. Hence,
this value might be anything depending on what has been specified, and
what is known about the incident.
Figure 8.1: Representation of incident and affected area
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8.2 Risk Objects
The second part of our risk visualization semantics concerns the visualiza-
tion of risk objects. A risk object is a physical object (e.g. a house, a forest
area) located within the incident area that as a result of the incident that
has occurred pose a risk to a specific type of asset (e.g. life and health, ma-
terial values). In accordance with the first version of visualization seman-
tics as described in Chapter 6, a risk object is represented by a graphical
element positioned directly on the map where the physical object is lo-
cated. Depending on the type of physical object that is being represented,
and the risk-level associated with the object, the graphical elements and
attributes used to represent the object, may differ. In the remainder of this
section, we provide a detailed description of how risk objects are visual-
ized in terms of type, risk-level, consequence, likelihood and underlying
factors.
8.2.1 Risk Object Type
By the term risk object type, we refer to what kind of object that is being
represented. As a general classification, we differentiate between risk ob-
ject types that (typically) have a large physical extent, risk object types that
(typically) have a medium physical extent, and risk object types that (typ-
ically) have a small physical extent. The motivation for representing risk
object types differently depending on their physical extent, is to maintain a
balance between the visibility of risk objects regardless of their size, as this
does not necessarily correlate with the objects’ importance. If, for example,
all risk objects were represented by means of polygons, one might have
great difficulties noticing a gas tank (as its respective polygon would be
tiny when viewed from long distances), even though this gas tank might
pose a much greater risk than that found in a forest area. Conversely, if all
risk objects were represented by means of icons, it would be difficult for
the viewer to determine, for example, where a forest area ends, and where
it begins. In the list below, we describe the nature and representation for
each of these three classes of risk objects:
• Risk objects types that typically have a large physical extent include
area types such as forest and farmland, and are represented by means
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of polygons clamped on top of the actual physical object they are rep-
resenting.
• Risk object types that typically have a medium physical extent in-
clude object types such as buildings, and are represented both by
a polygon clamped on top of the actual physical object it is repre-
senting, and an icon symbolizing the object, positioned above this
polygon.
• Risk object types that typically have a small physical extent include
object types such as gas tanks, and are represented by means of an
icon symbolizing the object, positioned directly above its location in
the map.
In similarity with the first implementation of the visualization seman-
tics, this implementation has the expressiveness to represent three main
types of risk objects, including forest areas (large extent type) buildings
(medium extent type) and explosive hazards (small extent type). How-
ever, in order to reduce the chance of having viewers interpret buildings
differently, a fine-course granularity of building types has been incorpo-
rated into the visualizations. Instead of visualizing all buildings by means
of the same icon, houses, cabins and industry buildings are now repre-
sented by different icons as shown in Figure 8.2. In addition to the use of
icons to represent buildings, each building is also represented by means of
a polygon (preferably 3D) holding the shape of the building, in accordance
with the representation of medium extent object types as described above.
Furthermore, a forest area is represented by means of a polygon shaped as
the forest area it is representing, while an explosive hazard is represented
by means of an explosive hazard icon. For a short and clear representation
of risk object types, see Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.2: Representation of risk object types (icons)
The icons used to represent risk object types are obtained from a collection of freely
available icons. The icon collection and information about the project can be found at
http://code.google.com/p/google-maps-icons/.
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Figure 8.3: Representation of risk object types (polygons)
As it might often be the case that there exists a large number of small- or
medium extent risk objects within an area (e.g. buildings), a visualization
might become cluttered from the large amount of icons that are displayed
simultaneously. To bridge this problem, risk objects icons that are equiv-
alent in terms of type and located in close proximity of each other on the
map, may be represented by means of one icon denoting a cluster of risk
objects. Necessarily, the clustering of icons should take into account the
distance from which the visualizations are viewed in the map, as the prox-
imity of icons will vary depending on this distance. As an example of this,
a group of house icons may be in close proximity of each other when the
visualizations are viewed from a far-away distance, while quite distant
when visualizations are viewed from a close perspective. In Figure 8.4, we
present a set of icons representing clusters of the various risk objects types
described in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.4: Representation of risk object clustered types
8.2.2 Risk Object Risk-Level
As one of the most crucial aspects of our solution for visualization of risk,
we want to make it possible for viewers to compare risk objects with one
another in terms of risk criticality. In order to achieve this, each graphical
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element representing a risk object is colorized according to what risk-level
they are to be associated with (see Figure 8.5), where the latter is given by
the risk objects risk-value (i.e. the product of likelihood and consequence).
A scale of four different risk-levels is utilized, ranging from low risk repre-
sented by a green color, to moderate risk represented by yellow, to high risk
represented by orange, to catastrophic risk represented by a red color. The
choice of color is based on the findings of [58], showing that there is a hier-
archy in different colors ability to represent risk, where red is perceived as
representing a higher risk than yellow, which is perceived as representing
a higher risk than green. Notably, the use of only 4 colors to represent dif-
ferent concepts is also well within the cognitive limit of 5-8 colors, as sug-
gested in [19]. To support the visualization of risk-level, a legend is also
provided, explaining the relation between each risk-level and its respec-
tive color representation. By utilizing four risk-levels and four associated
colors to classify and describe all possible ranges of risk-values, we aim
to reduce the complexity of the visualizations and the cognitive load they
put on their viewers.
Figure 8.5: Representation of risk object risk level using color
8.2.3 Risk Object Information Balloons
In order to avoid information overload in our visualizations, some types
of information are hidden within so-called information balloons, visible
only on request from the viewers. In simple terms, an information balloon
is a small sized window holding information about a certain element in
the visualization, visually connected with this element by a tail or pointer
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(see Figure 8.6). To bring up additional information about a risk object, the
user selects this element by clicking on it, causing an information balloon
to appear, along with a blue outline encircling the risk object. The blue
outline denotes what point/area the content in the information balloon
applies to. To close the information balloon, the user click on the button
marked with an X, located on its top right corner (see Figure 8.6). In the
case where the selected element is a risk object, the information balloon
contains three clickable tabs, including Consequence, Likelihood and Factors
(the Consequence tab is highlighted by default). By clicking on a tab, the
content in the information balloon change to reflect each heading respec-
tively. Throughout the remainder of this section, we will describe how the
content within each of these tabs are represented.
Figure 8.6: Representation of risk object information balloons
8.2.4 Risk Object Unwanted Incident
Although risk likelihood and consequence may have their own measures
and representations, both are always inherently associated with an event
(i.e. the likelihood for- and the consequence of-, an event taking place). To
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communicate both the nature of this event, and to associate it with con-
sequence and likelihood, the first version of visualization semantics made
use of a textual description of the event located on the top left corner of the
information balloon. As highlighted by the findings in chapter 7 however,
the problem with this representation seemed to be that the unwanted inci-
dent information was not presented in direct relation with neither conse-
quence nor likelihood, but rather as a separate piece of information, mak-
ing it difficult for viewers to see a connection. In an effort to rectify this
issue, this version of the visualization semantics describes the unwanted
incident in direct relation with both consequence and likelihood. Respec-
tively, this is done by adding a heading: “Consequence of <event>” to
the consequence tab, and a heading “Likelihood for <event>” to the like-
lihood tab, where<event> is replaced by a textual description of the event
(e.g. “fire”, “explosion”). Examples of these headings can be seen in Fig-
ure 8.7 and Figure 8.8.
8.2.5 Risk Object Consequence
The consequence related to a risk object (i.e. “the impact of an unwanted
incident on an asset” [52] ), is represented by means of a consequence value
and an asset description, along with a textual reference to an unwanted in-
cident as described in section 8.2.4. Consequence values provide a textual
description of the impact the occurrence of the unwanted incident have
on the asset. In accordance with the range of consequence values utilized
in [52], this value may take one of the following five forms, depending
on the severity of the impact: insignificant, minor, moderate, major or catas-
trophic. An asset description provides a textual account of the assets na-
ture (i.e. the character of the asset), and have thus no fixed set of values.
However, we sustain that one should try to keep the description as short
and concise as possible in order to minimize the cognitive load the visu-
alizations puts on their viewers, and to avoid cluttering the visualizations
with excessive information. Notably also, and as exemplified in Figure
8.7, the asset description is always presented ahead of the consequence
value, separated by a colon (:). Above the asset description and consequence
value, a label is given, connecting the former with its associated unwanted
incident, as specified in section 8.2.4. Unlike the first version of visualiza-
tion semantics as presented in Chapter 6, this version does not make use
of a meter-diagram to communicate consequence value, as the color-scale
utilized in the meter-diagram seemed to cause ambiguity, and confusion
among viewers. For a short overview and example of the representation
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of risk object consequence, see Figure 8.7.
Figure 8.7: Representation of risk object consequence
8.2.6 Risk Object Likelihood
The likelihood related to a risk object (i.e. the probability that the un-
wanted incident will occur), is represented by means of a likelihood value,
along with a textual reference to an unwanted incident, as described in sec-
tion 8.2.4. Likelihood values provide a textual description of how likely/unlikely
it is that the associated unwanted incident will occur, and may in accor-
dance with the range of likelihood values utilized in [52], take one of the
following five forms: rare, unlikely, possible, likely or certain. Unlike the first
version of visualization semantics as presented in Chapter 6, this version
does not make use of a meter-diagram to communicate likelihood, as the
color-scale utilized in the meter diagram seemed to cause ambiguity, and
more confusion than enlightenment. For a short overview and example of
the representation of risk object likelihood, see Figure 8.8.
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Figure 8.8: Representation of risk object likelihood
8.2.7 Risk Object Factors
The likelihood for- and the consequence of, an unwanted incident, are al-
ways affected by a number of underlying factors. As an example of this,
the likelihood for a wildfire spreading to a house may be affected by fac-
tors such as wind direction and wind strength, while the consequence of
a house burning down may be affected by factors such as the size of the
building and the number of people living there. In order to communicate
underlying factor information for risk objects, a factors tab is provided in
each information balloon, holding zero or more factor descriptions. Each
factor description consist of two parts, including (in the order of appear-
ance) a description of factor type (e.g. Wind strength, Temperature), and a
description of factor value (e.g. 8 m/s, 30° Celsius). The factor type and factor
value are presented on the same line, separated by a colon (:). For a short
overview and an example of the representation of risk object underlying
factors, see Figure 8.9.
In accordance with the suggestions for improvements presented in Chap-
ter 7, this version of visualization semantics incorporates functionality
to bring out additional information about factor values, provided that
such additional information has been specified. In order to signify for
8.2. Risk Objects 81
Figure 8.9: Representation of risk object underlying factors
the viewer that a more detailed description of a given factor value is avail-
able, the value itself is formatted in the style of a standard HTML link
(blue underlined text). By clicking the factor value, the content in the in-
formation balloon is changed to display a description of the factor value.
Notably, functionality to return from the factor value description to the
factor overview is provided by means of a back label, also formatted in
the style of a link. See Figure 8.10 for an illustration of how this function-
ality works.
Figure 8.10: Accessing factor value description
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It should be emphasized that although we do not set an upper limit on
the number of factor descriptions included in the factors tab, this does not
mean that we suggest that all related factors should be included. Con-
versely, we believe that a consideration should be made regarding which
factors that should be admitted, and which factors that should be omitted,
based on their importance and relevance for the given risk.
In this chapter we have introduced a revised solution for visualization
of risk, taking into account the findings from the evaluation presented in
Chapter 7. In the next chapter, we evaluate the solution presented here.
Chapter 9
Second Risk Visualization
Solution Evaluation
In order to evaluate the revised solution for visualization of risk, as intro-
duced in Chapter 8, we recruited 6 students from the University of Oslo
to take part in a usability test. The main goal of the testing was to evalu-
ate the solution in terms of usability. In general, the findings indicate that
the solution is efficiently capable of generating insight that enables users
to prioritize between small- and medium extent risk objects related to an
incident, and to understand why some risk objects are more critical than
others. We also found that the solution still have a great potential for im-
provement, particularly in relation to the communication of large-extent
risk objects. In this chapter, we provide an in-depth description of the us-
ability testing, along with a detailed presentation and discussion of our
findings. First however, we start off by clarifying the aim of the study.
9.1 Aim of the Study
The aim of the study was to evaluate the usability of the revised solution for
visualization of risk, as presented in Chapter 8. In particular, we wanted
to shed light on the solution in terms of the usability criteria listed below,
and test the hypotheses as stated under Efficiency:
• Effectiveness: To what extent does the solution generate insight among
its users, with respect to the information it is meant to convey?
• Efficiency: Does the solution make users put greater focus on more
critical risk objects than less critical risk objects, and is insight gener-
ated efficiently?
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– Hypothesis 1: Users will extract a greater amount of informa-
tion from more critical risk objects in the visualizations, than
from less critical risk objects.
– Hypothesis 2: Users will extract information from more criti-
cal risk objects in the visualizations before extracting information
from less critical risk objects.
• Satisfaction: Do the users find the visualizations easy to understand
and navigate, and do they perceive the solution as useful?
Additionally, we were also interested in collecting the participants’
general opinion about the solution, focusing on strengths, weaknesses and
suggestions for improving the solution.
9.2 Method
The study was conducted as a usability test, which involves “measuring
users’ performance and evaluating their satisfaction with the system in question
on certain tasks in a laboratory setting” [49]. In difference from traditional us-
ability testing however, where participants typically perform specific tasks,
this study made use of an high-level, open-ended task, where participants
were encouraged to explore risk visualizations in their own way while uti-
lizing a think aloud protocol, as suggested by North in [40]. Claiming that
“the purpose of visualization is insight” [40], North suggests that a visual-
ization evaluation should involve an “open-ended protocol” (as opposed to
traditional benchmark tasks), a “qualitative insight analysis”, and an empha-
sis on “domain relevance”. The advantage of this approach, in comparison
with traditional usability testing, is that it eliminates the bias created by
instructing users in what they should look for in the visualizations, enabling
us to determine what users understand on their own:
“This method’s fundamental concept is to change the benchmark tasks
from an independent to a dependent variable. Hence, instead of in-
structing users in exactly what insights to gain, researchers observe
what insights users gain on their own.” [40]
The study was documented by means of observation, audio recording
and screen capture (recording screen output). Additionally, a user satisfac-
tion questionnaire was utilized, enabling participants to give their subjec-
tive opinion regarding various aspects of the solution, point out strengths
and problematic aspects, and make suggestions for improvements.
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9.2.1 Participants
A sample of 6 students participated in the study. The participants were
chosen based on a convenience sampling strategy [57], by asking the stu-
dents directly if they wanted to take part in the study. The size of the sam-
ple was determined first and foremost by our choice of research method.
According to the “practical guide to usability testing” given in [10], a “typical
test includes 6-12 participants”. Advantageously, to increase domain rele-
vance and external validity, the sample should rather have included oper-
ative leaders instead of students. Unfortunately however, despite a great
deal of effort, we did not manage to recruit operative leaders to take part
in the study. Nevertheless, drawing on the findings from the first evalu-
ation (see Chapter 7) indicating that there is no general consensus among
operative leaders with respect to the concept of risk, we believe that the
findings in this study to a certain degree also generalize to operative lead-
ers.
9.2.2 Materials
In order to test our solution in terms of usability, we built 3 interactive vi-
sualizations, respectively visualizing 3 different emergency situation sce-
narios including (1) a detached home fire, (2) an industry fire, and (3) a
wildfire (see Figure 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3). By utilizing the Keyhole Markup Lan-
guage (KML) and Google Earth, we managed to make each visualization
adhere completely to the revised solution proposal presented in Chapter
8, both in terms of functionality, interactivity and graphical representa-
tion. Furthermore, to make sure the incident scenarios were realistic, and
thus maintain a high degree of ecological validity, the incident scenarios
were essentially equivalent with those utilized in the first evaluation (see
Chapter 7). The only changes made to the scenarios, were committed to
maintain a balance across the visual representativeness of each risk level
(i.e. to make sure that each risk level was represented with an equal num-
ber of risk objects), and thus increase the internal validity when measuring
efficiency. Additionally, an open-ended task-scenario was developed, pro-
viding the participants with a high-level goal to achieve while interacting
with each visualization. The task scenario is reproduced below:
• Task Scenario: Imagine that you are the operative leader responsible for
handling the emergency situation. You have a short amount of time on your
hands to understand what’s going on, and to determine how to respond.
Explore the visualization and try to understand as much as possible about
the emergency situation, taking time-criticality into account.
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Figure 9.1: Wildfire scenario visualization
Figure 9.2: Industry fire scenario visualization
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Figure 9.3: Detached home fire visualization
In order to let the participants explore and interact with the visualiza-
tions, each visualization was rendered onto a high resolution map using
Google Earth. Besides rendering the visualizations correctly, Google Earth
also provided functionality to manipulate the perspective of the map (e.g.
zoom, pan, tilt), enabling participants to interactively explore the visual-
izations from different perspectives. Additionally, as mentioned earlier,
a user satisfaction questionnaire was utilized. While the first part of this
questionnaire contained a set of statements that participants were to rate
by means of a Likert scale (i.e. strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree
nor disagree, agree, strongly agree) [29], the second part encouraged par-
ticipants to identify well-working and problematic aspects of the solution,
and make suggestions for improvements. Notably, a copy of this question-
naire can be found in Appendix B.
In terms of practicalities, the study was conducted in a private meeting
room at the University of Oslo, using a normal desktop computer with a
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17” monitor. To interact with the computer, a keyboard and a mouse point-
ing device was provided. Audio recording and screen capture was facili-
tated through an application running on the computer, aside Google Earth,
enabling us to record both audio and screen output simultaneously. An
informed consent regarding privacy and use of data collected in the eval-
uation, approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD),
was handed out and filled in by the participants ahead of the evaluation,
in agreement with NSD regulations.
9.2.3 Procedure
The usability testing was conducted individually for each participant, con-
sisting of 3 main parts and lasting for approximately 25 minutes. In the
first part of the test, we explained the general idea behind our solution for
visualization of risk, the aim of the evaluation, and the course of the test.
In particular, the participants were presented with the task scenario de-
scribed in Section 9.2.2, and instructed in utilizing a think aloud protocol.
Additionally, the participants were also instructed in how to manipulate
map perspective in Google Earth.
As soon as the participants understood their task and were comfort-
able with using Google Earth, the testing could begin. One at a time, each
of the 3 visualizations were loaded into Google Earth, and presented to the
participants. For each visualization, participants were then asked to solve
the open-ended task scenario (see Section 9.2.2), while thinking out loud.
During this part of the test, we observed the participants while interacting
with the visualizations, while simultaneously recording audio and screen
output. In accordance with North’s approach [40], we did not set a strict
time limit for how long participants could interact with each visualization.
Instead, participants were encouraged to move on after spending approx-
imately 3 minutes on a visualization, or when they signaled that they had
nothing more to add.
In the third part of the test, we asked the participants to fill in the user
satisfaction questionnaire, where they were given a chance to express their
subjective opinion about the solution, point out strengths and problematic
aspects, and make suggestions for improvements.
9.2.4 Analysis
The observations and recordings were analyzed by means of a qualitative
analysis. In the first part of this analysis, the data was categorized ac-
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cording to what aspects of the solution it was relevant for. To guide the
categorization, a list of categories corresponding to the various aspects of
the solution that we wanted to evaluate was developed ahead of the anal-
ysis, as shown in Table 9.1. Notably, this list was equivalent with the task-
scenarios utilized in the first evaluation (see Chapter 7). Following the
high level categorization, the data was then analyzed further by means of
open coding [51], involving a process of examining and conceptualizing the
data on a finer granularity.
Table 9.1: Categories used to analyze data
No. Description
1 Understanding incident information.
2 Understanding risk object types (e.g. building, explosive haz-
ard).
3 Understanding risk level related to risk objects.
4 Understanding consequence related to risk objects.
5 Understanding likelihood related to risk objects.
6 Understanding underlying factors related to risk objects.
In order to test the hypotheses related to the efficiency of the solution
(see Section 9.1), a quantitative approach was applied. To shed light on
the first hypothesis, we registered for each risk level, the number of times
risk objects associated with that risk level, or tabs within these risk ob-
jects’ information balloons, were clicked. Clicks that were clearly unin-
tentional (e.g. cases where participants due to a lack of precision acci-
dentally clicked the wrong object) were disregarded. The four resulting
values were then compared by means of a descriptive statistics. To shed
light on the second hypothesis, we registered the order in which each risk
level was attended to, by counting the number of times risk objects from
each risk level were the first, second, third or fourth object to be clicked by
a participant. Consecutive clicks on risk objects associated with the same
risk level were disregarded. The resulting 16 numbers (4 numbers for each
risk level) were then compared by means of descriptive statistics, reported
as a stacked column chart. Notably, inferential statistics were disregarded
due to the small sample size.
The first part of the user satisfaction questionnaire, which contained
statements that participants were to rate by means of a Likert scale [29],
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was also analyzed by means of descriptive statistics, where the responses
were converted to percentages, and presented in bar charts. The second
part of the questionnaire, where participants were encouraged to point
out well-working- and problematic aspects with the solution, along with
suggestions for improvements, was analyzed qualitatively as a part of the
qualitative analysis carried out on observational data.
9.3 Findings
First in this section, we present the results from the qualitative analysis
carried out on the observational data collected in the usability test. Fol-
lowing this, we then move on to present an overview of the results from
tracking the users’ interaction with the visualizations. In the third part, we
account for the results from the user satisfaction questionnaire.
9.3.1 Observations
In this section we describe the results from the qualitative analysis carried
out on the observational data collected in the usability test. By observa-
tional data, we refer not only to what the evaluator observed during the
test, but also to what we learned through analyzing the audio- and screen-
output recordings qualitatively. The findings are structured according to
the analysis categories outlined in Table 9.1.
Understanding incident information
In general, participants identified the location of the incidents correctly,
linking it to the position of the incident icon on the map. Interestingly
however, although the location of the incident was frequently the first as-
pect to be highlighted by participants, only some of the participants re-
quested more information about the incident before moving on to other
parts of the visualizations. Nevertheless, participants typically did request
information about the incidents at some point while interacting with the
visualizations. When the incident icons were clicked, participants seemed
to have no problems understanding the incident severity information in-
cluded in the information balloons.
While one of the participants stated that he did not understand what
the blue outline in the visualizations was supposed to mean, another par-
ticipant correctly described the outline as representing the area affected by
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the incidents. Following this however, the latter participant also empha-
sized that he did not understand the rationale for the boundaries set by the
blue outline. A quote from the participant is included below (translated
from Norwegian):
“I can see that the area is constrained by means of the blue, but I don’t
understanding why, and I don’t trust it.. The boundaries means that
outside this [the participants points at the blue outline] there’s no
danger of anything happening, or.. we are not supposed to focus on
this area..”
Although none of the other participants mentioned the blue outline, it
should be highlighted that all participants focused their attention solely on
the area contained within the outline, disregarding the area on its outside.
The only exception to this observation was when participants accentuated
accessibility to the area, in terms of roads leading to the incident site.
Understanding risk object type
For most of the cases, participants identified houses, cabins, industry build-
ings and explosive hazard objects correctly. Clusters of buildings were
highlighted by two participants, and one of these also zoomed closer to-
wards the clustered icons to reveal the houses making up the building
cluster. Although both the polygons (3D models of the buildings) and
the icon representing medium extent risk objects were clickable, partic-
ipants generally clicked the icons to extract more information about the
objects. Nevertheless, all participants clearly interpreted the polygons as
representing the shape of the various buildings. One participant also high-
lighted that the polygons could be a very valuable feature, as it provides
facilities to get an exact look at the buildings involved in the incident.
Unlike the observation that both small- and medium extent risk objects
were interpreted correctly, several participants seemed to have problems
understanding the representation of large extent risk objects (i.e. forest
areas at risk). In fact, all participants seemed to be somewhat confused
regarding what meaning the polygons representing forest areas were sup-
posed to convey, even after clicking the polygons to investigate further.
Interestingly however, the confusion seemed to be caused more by par-
ticipants not seeing forest as something that could pose any risk, than by
not understanding that the polygons represented forest areas, This obser-
vation is exemplified in the quote below, where one participant gets sur-
prised when learning that forest pose risk (translated from Norwegian):
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“This seems to be a catastrophic area [the participant points at the
forest area at the center of the wildfire visualization] hmm, that
was a bit difficult to understand... [the participant clicks on one of
the forest areas to extract more information] Ahhh.. so we think
of the forest here.. well that’s nice...”
Furthermore, two participants even contemplated if the polygon at the
center of the wildfire visualization (see Figure 9.1) represented the fire it-
self, or the area already affected by the fire. Notably however, these sugges-
tions seemed to be an act of simply throwing out possible suggestions, as
both of these participants before making these suggestions first pinpointed
incident location correctly.
Understanding risk level
Throughout their interactions with the visualizations, participants made
frequent use of the color-coding utilized to represent different risk lev-
els. Using the color-coding, all participants generally attributed the correct
risk level to risk objects, and furthermore, based on this attribution, deter-
mined the order in which the objects should be prioritized. In fact, the
prioritization of risk objects based on risk level typically seemed to be the
first activity attended to when presented with a visualization (following
the identification of incident location), furthermore causing participants
to focus on more critical risk objects before attending to less critical ob-
jects. A quote from one of the participants is included below, describing
his first thoughts when presented with the detached home fire scenario
(see Figure 9.3) (translated from Norwegian):
“There’s a fire in the second rightmost house [the participants points
at the red colored house], and there is great risk of this fire spread-
ing to the house on its right hand side [the participant points at
the orange colored house], and progressively less risk for the other
houses..”
Drawing on the above, participants often disregarded both low- and
moderate-level risk objects, focusing their attention solely on catastrophic-
and high-level risk objects. This trend of prioritizing risk objects in terms
of risk level was also evident from the results of the interaction tracking
presented in Section 9.3.2.
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Understanding risk consequence
Based on the observations, participants generally established a good un-
derstanding of risk consequence while interacting with the visualizations.
Interestingly however, participants seemed to find some parts of the con-
sequence information more interesting and useful than other parts. In
particular, participants were (seemingly) less concerned with consequence
value (e.g. major, catastrophic), rather highlighting the asset at stake (e.g.
life and health) and the unwanted incident information (e.g. gas tank ex-
plosion).
Although the consequence information was displayed as default when
a risk object was clicked, this information was typically not the first infor-
mation to be highlighted by participants when an information balloon was
opened. Instead, participants often moved on to accentuate likelihood-
and factor information first, seemingly discarding the consequence infor-
mation. Notably, this effect was most evident after the participants had
become used to interacting with the visualizations. At the beginning of
the test, consequence information was often highlighted first.
Furthermore, participants often highlighted what asset that was at stake
while viewing the underlying factor information, instead of extracting it
from the consequence information. Although this might be a result of par-
ticipants devoting more attention to the factor information than to con-
sequence information, it may also indicate that the asset information in-
cluded in the consequence information in some cases might be redundant.
Understanding risk likelihood
In general, participants seemed to establish a good understanding of likeli-
hood. As intended, participants associated the likelihood-value (e.g. pos-
sible, very likely) with the unwanted incident description included in the
likelihood information, seemingly understanding that the likelihood-value
denoted the probability of the unwanted incident occurring. To some ex-
tent, participants seemed more interested in likelihood information, than
in consequence information, devoting more attention to the former than
the latter. Frequently, participants also seemed to utilize the likelihood in-
formation to determine why one risk object was more critical that another,
and why the former should thus be prioritized before the latter. To ex-
emplify this, we have included a quote from one of the participants while
interacting with the industry fire visualization (see Figure 9.2). The quote
is taken from when the participant clicks the explosive hazard object to
extract more information about it (translated from Norwegian):
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“Explosion.. Gas tank.. That sounds really dangerous! Perhaps one
should deal with this first..” [the participant clicks the likelihood
tab in the information balloon] “Ahh ok, so it’s unlikely that it
will explode.. In that case we have to deal with this first..” [the
participant points at the catastrophic building object].
Additionally, in the detached home fire scenario (see Figure 9.3), one
participant also utilized the likelihood information to decide that one should
put the greatest effort in saving the building next to the building on fire, as
it was very likely that the latter would burn down anyway, according to the
likelihood information.
Understanding risk underlying factors
The underlying factor information seemed to be a useful aspect of the vi-
sualizations, providing participants with concrete knowledge about the
various risk objects. Generally, participants interpreted the information
quickly, correctly and in direct relation to the risk object the information
was relevant for. To exemplify this, we have included a quote from one of
the participants when looking at the underlying factor information for the
catastrophic building object in the industry fire visualization:
“There’s many people in this building, 10+, and there’s 4 meters per
second wind-strength coming from North-West”
To some extent, participants seemed more interested in the underly-
ing factor information, than in consequence information, devoting more
attention to the former than the latter. In further similarity with the like-
lihood information, participants also seemed to utilize the factor informa-
tion to determine why one risk object was more critical than another, and
to compare the objects with one another. Unfortunately, participants rarely
accentuated the underlying factor information about large extent risk ob-
jects, making us unsure whether or not the factor information for these
objects were understandable or not. However, based on the participants’
interactions with both small- and medium extent risk objects, the under-
lying factor information seemed to be straightforward, and more easily
understandable than both consequence- and likelihood information.
9.3.2 Interaction Tracking
In this section we provide an overview of the results from tracking the
participants’ interactions with the solution. First, we present the distribu-
tion of risk information requests across risk levels. Second, we present an
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overview of the order in which information was requested. Notably, as
explained in Section 9.2.2, each visualization was balanced with respect to
the number of risk objects included from each risk level.
Risk Information Request Distribution
In Figure 9.4 we illustrate the distribution of risk information requests
(clicks) in terms of risk level. While 35% of all information requests were
directed towards catastrophic risk objects, 30% were directed towards high-
level risk objects. Following this, 22% of the information requests were di-
rected towards moderate-level risk objects, while the remaining 13% were
directed towards low-level risk objects.
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Figure 9.4: Risk information request distribution
Risk Information Request Order
In Figure 9.5 we illustrate the order in which risk information was re-
quested. In 83% of all cases, participants extracted information about
catastrophic risk objects before extracting information about less critical
risk objects. In 63% of all cases, (disregarding the cases where catastrophic
risk objects were selected second) participants extracted information about
high-level risk objects before extracting information about moderate- or
low-level risk objects. In 77% of the cases (disregarding the cases where
more critical risk objects were selected third), participants extracted in-
formation about moderate-level risk objects before extracting information
about low-level risk objects.
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Figure 9.5: Risk information retrieval order
9.3.3 Questionnaire
In Figure 9.6 we present an overview of the responses given in the first
part of the questionnaire, where participants were to rate various state-
ments about the visualizations they had just interacted with, by means of
a Likert scale [29]. As shown in Figure 9.6, the trend in the responses was
generally positive. In the majority of the cases, participants rated the vi-
sualizations as both easy understand, and easy to navigate. Furthermore,
most participants stated that the visualizations did provide them with a
good overview of the emergency situations, and how these situations are
likely to evolve in the future.
9.3. Findings 97
 
33 % 
66 % 
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
The visualizations are easy to 
understand: 
33 % 
16 % 
50 % 
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
The visualizations contain 
information that makes it easier to 
determine how to handle emergency 
situations: 
33 % 33 % 33 % 
0 %
5 %
10 %
15 %
20 %
25 %
30 %
35 %
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
The visualizations provide a good 
overview of the emergency situations: 
16 % 16 % 16 % 
50 % 
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
The visualizations provide a good 
overview of how emergency situations 
may evolve in the future: 
16 % 
84 % 
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
80 %
90 %
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
The visualizations are easy to 
navigate: 
50 % 
16 % 
33 % 
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly
agree
The visualizations are confusing and/or 
difficult to understand: 
Figure 9.6: User Satisfaction Ratings
98 9. Second Risk Visualization Solution Evaluation
In the second part of the questionnaire, we asked the participants to reflect
on which aspects of the visualizations they found to be useful (see Table
9.2), and which aspects of the visualizations they found to be problematic
(see Table 9.3). At the end of the questionnaire, participants were encour-
aged to make suggestions as to how the visualizations could be improved
(see Table 9.4). First, in Table 9.2, we present an overview of visualiza-
tions strengths highlighted by the participants. In accordance with the
results from the observation, several participants emphasized the use of
color-coding as an intuitive way to differentiate between risk levels. Fur-
thermore, participants also highlighted the icons, and the boundaries of
the incident area as easy to understand. Concrete information about risk
objects, as made available by the information balloons was also accentu-
ated as a valuable part of the visualizations.
Table 9.2: Visualization strengths highlighted by the participants
No. Description
1 Intuitive use of color-coding to differentiate between risk levels
made it easy to determine which risk objects to prioritize first.
2 The icons utilized in the visualizations were easy to understand,
clarifying what types of objects that were being represented.
3 The boundaries of the area affected by the incident were clearly
defined.
4 The map was informative and easy to use, providing high quality
graphics.
5 Access to concrete information about the risk objects was very
useful.
In Table 9.3 we present an overview of which aspects of the visual-
izations the participants highlighted as problematic. In accordance with
the findings from the observations, participants particularly emphasized
the representation of large extent risk objects as difficult to understand.
Additionally, participants also highlighted several issues with the tabbed
interface utilized in the information balloons.
In Table 9.4 we present a summary of suggestions for improvement, as
highlighted by the participants. In particular, to solve the issues regarding
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Table 9.3: Visualization problems highlighted by the participants
No. Description
1 Large extent risk objects (e.g. forest areas) did not provide visual
cues to show that they were clickable.
2 The tabbed interface in the information balloons makes it cum-
bersome to compare one risk object with another.
3 The tabbed interface in the information balloons causes excessive
interaction.
4 It was unclear what type of area the large extent risk objects rep-
resented.
5 It was unclear what the coloring of the large extent risk objects
were supposed to represent.
the tabbed interface in the information balloons (see Table 9.3), several par-
ticipants suggested presenting all risk object information simultaneously
on one page, discarding tabs as a whole. Instead of hiding wind-direction
and wind-strength information inside the factors tab, several participants
suggested that this information should be shown directly in the map by
means of a wind-direction shaft. Additionally, participants also made sev-
eral suggestions for additional functionality, such as visualizing safe evac-
uation areas, how far a fire has spread, and shortest route directions to the
incident site.
Table 9.4: Suggestions for improvements highlighted by the participants
No. Description
1 Present all information about a risk object on one page, instead of
using the tabbed interface.
2 Add directions to the visualizations, showing the shortest/best
route to the incident site.
3 Show safe evacuation areas (i.e. areas where evacuees could be
gathered) in the visualizations.
4 Represent wind direction and wind strength by means of an il-
lustrated wind-direction shaft, directly visible on the map.
5 Incorporate a notion showing how far a fire has spread, in addi-
tion to showing where the fire started.
6 Show a short description of a risk object when the mouse cursor
hovers over it.
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9.4 Discussion
In this section, we evaluate the usability of the solution by discussing and
interpreting the findings presented in Section 9.3. The section is structured
according to the 3 usability criteria outlined in Section 9.1.
9.4.1 Effectiveness
A crucial success criterion for our solution for visualization of risk, is that
it should be effectively capable of generating insight among its users, with
respect to the various types of risk information users need to understand.
To shed light on the effectiveness of the solution, we proposed the follow-
ing research question:
To what extent does the solution generate insight among its
users, with respect to the information it is meant to convey?
The general impression from the usability testing is that the solution to a
large extent does generate insight among its users. Through interacting
with the visualizations, users developed a comprehensive understanding
of the emergency situations, largely enabling them to determine how risk
objects should be prioritized, and to rationalize why certain risk objects
are more critical than others. The effectiveness of the solution was most
evident in terms of communicating the location, nature and criticality of
small- and medium extent risk objects. As particularly useful with respect
to the latter, we highlight the color-scale used to represent different risk
levels, the use of icons to represent different risk object types, and the func-
tionality to view underlying factor information about risk objects.
Another interesting finding in the study was that the solution seemed
to have a high degree of learnability, even for users with no experience
or knowledge with in handling emergency situations. Despite not being
given any training or instructions on how to use or interpret the visu-
alizations (except how to manipulate map perspective), all participants
quickly learned how to extract additional information about objects, and
what most parts of the visualizations were supposed to mean.
Even though several aspects of the solution seemed to have a high de-
gree of effectiveness, the findings also indicate several problematic as-
pects. First and foremost, it was clear that the solution did not succeed in
communicating large-extent risk objects to the users. Although we are not
certain why users found large extent risk objects so difficult to understand,
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we believe one contributing factor might be that the participants taking
part in the study did not intuitively see forest areas as something that
would pose any risk. Drawing on this, it would be interesting to conduct
the same study with operative leaders, to see whether or not the problem
would still be evident. In comparison with small- and medium extent risk
objects, which were expressed in the visualizations by means of an icon
holding a symbol representing the risk objects’ type, colorized according
to its associated risk level, large extent risk objects were represented solely
by means of polygons colorized according to risk level. Hence, to improve
the representation of large extent risk objects, it might be fruitful to add an
icon to the representation, clarifying what type of object that is being rep-
resented. This way, we might also resolve some of the problematic aspects
highlighted by participants, emphasizing that large-extent risk objects did
not provide visual cues to show that they were clickable, and that it was
unclear what type of area the large extent risk objects were supposed to
represent. As another alternative however, it might also be fruitful to add
a pattern directly onto the polygon, symbolizing the object type (e.g. a
tree-pattern to symbolize a forest area).
In Table 9.4, we outlined participants’ suggestions for improving the
solution, as highlighted in their responses to the questionnaire. Partic-
ularly interesting in relation to the effectiveness of the solution, was the
suggestion to represent wind-strength and wind-direction directly in the
map, instead of hiding this information within information balloons. By
visualizing environmental factor information such as wind and tempera-
ture directly on the map, instead of tying it to risk objects, the information
could not only be used to rationalize why one object is more critical than
another, but also to build a better understanding of the emergency situa-
tion as a whole. Furthermore, by representing the information in one sin-
gle place, instead of duplicating it for every single risk object it is relevant
for, we also reduce the amount of information included in the visualiza-
tions, and thus also the cognitive load put on the users.
Another appealing suggestion from the participants, was to add direc-
tions to the map, showing the shortest path to incident sites and/or risk
objects. In our opinion however, the most interesting aspect of this sugges-
tion is that the route one has to follow to get to incident sites or risk ob-
jects, might also affect the order in which risk objects should be dealt with.
If a risk object (e.g. a cabin) is unreachable by car for example, it might
be more profitable to prioritize other reachable objects first, even though
these objects are less critical than the former, than to spend hours getting to
this one risk object. By showing directions directly on the map, displayed
alongside risk information, users should be better suited to take accessi-
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bility into account when prioritizing risk objects, and to resolve issues like
the one in the example above before arriving on scene. Nevertheless, one
should remember that by adding this information to the visualizations,
one also increase the cognitive load put on their viewers.
9.4.2 Efficiency
Alongside being effectively capable of generating insight among its users,
a solution must also be efficient, so that users can extract and understand
the information they need quickly and easily, focusing on the most impor-
tant information first. To shed light on the efficiency of our solution, we
proposed the following research question:
Does the solution make users put greater focus on more critical
risk objects than less critical risk objects, and does it generate
insight efficiently?
Based on the findings from the observations, the solution generally gener-
ated insight in an efficient manner: Within minutes of interacting with the
visualizations, and without receiving any form of training, users were ca-
pable of explaining the emergency situations in terms of incident- and risk
information, determining the order in which risk objects should be prior-
itized, and rationalizing their choice of prioritization using the available
consequence-, likelihood- and underlying factor information. Particularly
efficient were the color-coding used to represent different risk levels, en-
abling users to almost immediately determine which risk objects that are
most critical, and which objects that are less critical.
Generally, the interactivity provided in the visualizations worked well,
and users efficiently extracted information about risk objects, navigating
easily through the tabbed interface in the information balloons. Neverthe-
less, and as highlighted by the users themselves (see Table 9.4), it might
be possible to achieve even greater efficiency by discarding the tabbed in-
terface and rather present all information on the same page in the infor-
mation balloon. Instead of having to specify which type of information
one wants to see, all information associated with a risk object could thus
be accessed through one single step. In particular, we believe this could
increase efficiency when interacting with the visualizations by means of
touch-screens and/or small handheld devices, as our experience with these
devices is that they often provide less precise and more cumbersome inter-
action facilities. However, we also see a potential downside of presenting
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all information simultaneously, as there is a chance that this will only make
it increasingly difficult for users to extract the specific pieces of informa-
tion they are looking for, hence causing reduced efficiency and effective-
ness.
Another fruitful suggestion for increasing efficiency, also highlighted
by the users (see Table 9.4), is to incorporate some kind of tool tip that
displays a short description of a risk object when the mouse cursor hov-
ers over it. In particular, we believe this functionality could be useful for
clarifying the object types associated with large extent risk objects, as users
often found this aspect confusing.
Based on the results from the interaction tracking as presented in Section
9.3.2, the solution did succeed in making participants put a greater focus
on more critical risk objects than less critical risk objects. In support of
our first hypothesis (see Section 9.1), and as illustrated in Figure 9.4, a
greater amount of information was retrieved from more critical risk objects, than
from less critical risk objects. Catastrophic risk objects got more attention
than high-level risk objects, which got more attention than moderate-level
objects, which got more attention than low-level risk objects. The distribu-
tion of risk information requests also showed that users often disregarded
moderate- and low-level risk objects completely. In support of our second
hypothesis (see Section 9.1), and as illustrated in Figure 9.5, users typically
also extracted information from more critical risk objects before extracting in-
formation from less critical risk objects. The risk information retrieval order
shows that users attended to catastrophic risk objects first, before respec-
tively moving on to high-, moderate- and low-level risk objects, in the
specified order. It should be emphasized however that the results only in-
dicate that the hypotheses are correct. To provide evidence for our claims,
we would have to make use inferential statistics to test the results, which
would have required a much higher number of participants, and a much
larger pool of data.
9.4.3 User Satisfaction
In our last research question, we wanted to test how satisfied the users
were with the solution, and get users feedback with respect to strengths,
problematic aspects, and suggestions for improving the solution. To shed
light on user satisfaction we proposed the following research question:
Do the users find the visualizations easy to understand and
navigate, and do they perceive the solution as useful?
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In accordance with the findings from observing the users interact with the
visualizations, the general trend in the user satisfaction ratings were pos-
itive, and most users rated the visualizations as both easy to understand
and easy to navigate. Interestingly however, even though none of the par-
ticipants disagreed with the statement saying that the visualizations were
easy to understand, 33% agreed with the statement saying that the visu-
alizations were confusing and/or difficult to understand. Based on the
other findings in the study, the underlying reason for these slightly contra-
dictory results may be that participants, albeit finding most aspects of the
visualizations intuitive, also had problems understanding certain other as-
pects. In particular, drawing on the problematic aspects highlighted by
the participants themselves, and the findings from the observations, we
believe the main cause of the results was the problems encountered with
understanding large-extent risk objects. In fact, as highlighted in Table 9.3,
all problems related to understanding the visualizations were somehow as-
sociated with large-extent risk objects.
Even though all participants agreed that the visualizations were easy
to navigate, several participants nevertheless highlighted the tabbed inter-
face utilized in the information balloons as cumbersome to use. As an ex-
planation for these seemingly conflicting results, we believe that the posi-
tive ratings to a large degree were addressed towards the spatial controls
provided to manipulate map perspective (e.g. zoom, pan, tilt). The ratio-
nale for this suggestion is first and foremost that the participants, seemed
to find these controls both easy and intuitive to understand.
By looking at the ratings from the questionnaire in light of the iden-
tified strengths (see Table 9.2), users seemed to be highly satisfied with
the representation of different risk-levels, as this made it easier for them
to determine which risk objects that should be prioritized first. Further-
more, users also seemed to be satisfied with the representation of different
types of small- and large-extent risk objects, and the representation of in-
cident area. The high quality map and access to additional information
about risk objects might also have contributed to raise the users’ subjec-
tive satisfaction with the solution. Despite the positive trend in the user
satisfaction ratings, users nevertheless identified much potential for im-
provement. Aside from discarding the tabbed interface in the information
balloons, as thoroughly discussed in Section 9.4.2, users also proposed sev-
eral suggestions as to how the solution should be extended, as discussed
in Section 9.4.1. Nevertheless, the results evidently show that the users
generally perceived the solution as useful.
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9.5 Threats to Validity
In terms of generalizability, there are clear limitations in a small-scale study
like the one reported here. For instance, although a number of six par-
ticipants is normal in usability testing, it is not enough to make use of
inferential statistics to test the collected quantitative data with respect to
statistical significance.
Another obvious threat to the external validity of our findings, is that
the participants taking part in the study are not representative of the target
group, which includes operative leaders. However, drawing on the find-
ings from the first evaluation (see Chapter 7) indicating that there is no gen-
eral consensus among operative leaders with respect to the concept of risk,
we believe that the findings in this study to a certain degree can be gener-
alized to apply to operative leaders as well. In comparison with the stu-
dents taking part in this study, operative leaders should intuitively, draw-
ing on their first-hand experience and professional knowledge, if anything
be better suited to make sense of the visualized emergency situations. On
the other hand however, there might also be a possibility that operative
leaders, also due to their professional knowledge, will interpret the visu-
alizations differently. Drawing on this, we believe that a thorough evalu-
ation together with operative leaders would be strictly necessary to confirm
the findings reported here.
An issue related to the ecological validity of the study, is that the lab-
oratory setting in which the study was carried out, does not approximate
the real life situation in which the solution is meant to be utilized. While
an emergency situation is typically characterized by stressful, attention-
demanding and harsh environments, the evaluation was conducted in the
calm atmosphere of a meeting room. Intuitively, we find it likely that uti-
lizing the solution would be more demanding in a real life situation, than
it was in the laboratory setting used in the study. Nevertheless, it should
be emphasized that the participants in the study were presented with time-
critical emergency scenarios, where they had to interpret the visualizations
in a matter of minutes.
Furthermore, it is also clear that the incident scenarios utilized in the
study are not really representative of the variety of incidents that may oc-
cur. In particular, we believe it would be interesting to see how well the
solution would work in even larger scenarios than those visualized in this
study. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to see how well suited the
solution is to represent other types of emergencies than fire incidents.
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9.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have evaluated the usability of the revised solution for
visualization of risk, as presented in Chapter 8, focusing on effectiveness,
efficiency and user satisfaction.
In terms of effectiveness, we found that the solution to a large extent
does generate insight among its users, with respect to the risk information
it is meant to convey. Through interacting with the visualizations, users
developed a comprehensive understanding of the emergency situations,
enabling them to determine how small- and medium extent risk objects
should be prioritized during an emergency response operation, and to ra-
tionalize why some of these risk objects are more critical than others. As
particularly effective with respect to the latter, we highlight the color-scale
used to represent different risk levels, the use of icons to represent different
risk object types, and the functionality to view underlying factor informa-
tion about risk objects. However, it was also clear that the solution did not
succeed in communicating large-extent risk objects. In fact, users seemed
to have problems understanding all aspects of these objects.
With regards to efficiency, we found that the solution generally gener-
ated insight in an efficient manner. Within minutes of interacting with the
visualizations, and without receiving any form of training, users were ca-
pable of explaining the emergency situations in terms of incident- and risk
information, determining the order in which (small- and medium extent)
risk objects should be prioritized, and rationalizing their choice of prior-
itization using the available information. Particularly efficient were the
color-coding used to represent different risk levels, enabling users to al-
most immediately determine which risk objects that are most critical, and
which objects that are less critical. Furthermore, the findings also indicate
that the solution was efficient in terms of making users put a greater focus
on more critical risk objects than less critical risk objects. In support of the
latter, users did extract a greater amount of information from more criti-
cal risk objects, than from less critical risk objects, and attended to more
critical risk objects before attending to less critical objects. In relation to
improving the efficiency of the solution, the tabbed interface was high-
lighted as a possible bottleneck, causing excessive interaction and making
it cumbersome to compare risk objects with one another.
Regarding user satisfaction, we found that users generally perceived
the solution as useful, rating the visualizations as both easy to understand
and easy to navigate. Nevertheless, it was also clear that there were some
aspects of the solution that the participants were less satisfied with. In par-
ticular, and in accordance with the findings concerning effectiveness and
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efficiency, users seemed to be frustrated with how large extent risk objects
were represented, and with the tabbed interface utilized in the information
balloons.
In summary, the findings in this study indicate that the proposed solu-
tion for visualization of risk is efficiently capable of generating insight that
enables users to prioritize between small- and medium extent risk objects
related to an incident, and to understand why some risk objects are more
critical than others. The findings also show that the solution still have a
great potential for improvement, particularly in relation to the communi-
cation of large-extent risk objects, which did not work as intended.
In this chapter we have evaluated the solution for visualization of risk
introduced in Chapter 9. In the next chapter, we introduce a proposal as
to how the solution can be realized technically.
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Chapter 10
Risk Visualization Solution
Implementation
So far in this thesis, we have disregarded all technicalities and focused
our attention solely on the design and expressiveness of risk visualiza-
tions. In this chapter, we take a step further and introduce a proposal to
how a solution for visualization of risk can be realized technically, using
Open Source technologies only. As the proposal introduced in this chapter
has been implemented as a part of this thesis, the chapter is structured as
a walkthrough of that implementation, explaining how each component
was realized. First and foremost however, in Section 10.1, we provide a
general overview of the implementation, clarifying what components it
consists of, and how these components are structured.
10.1 Components and Structure
In Chapter 5, we introduced a solution structure consisting of 3 internal
components, and 1 external component, working together to produce and
visualize risk information for incidents specified by a user (see Figure 5.2).
In accordance with this structure, our implementation consists of the fol-
lowing 3 internal components (see Figure 10.1):
• A risk visualizationmap responsible for receiving incident data from
users, and communicating visualizations to users by rendering these
in a digital geospatial environment.
• A risk visualization controller responsible for handling all commu-
nication between both the internal components a solution consists
of, and the external components it depends on.
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• A risk visualization generator responsible for converting risk data
for a given incident into visualizations that can be rendered in the
risk visualization map.
Additionally, the implementation is dependent on an external component
responsible for supplying the solution with risk data from which visual-
izations can be produced. In order to generate risk data, the external com-
ponent must first be provided with data describing the incident of which
one wants to generate risk data for. In accordance with Chapter 5, we refer
to this component as a risk information generator, and treat it as a black box.
In terms of structure, the implementation is based on a client-server model,
where the risk visualization map acts as a client running in a web browser,
while the other three components reside on a centralized server. By utiliz-
ing a client-server design, we aim to unload clients from heavy data loads,
increase performance, enable centralized data storage, and allow for dis-
tribution of visualization data to multiple clients simultaneously. In Fig-
ure 10.1, we clarify the structure of the implementation by illustrating and
explaining how the 4 components described above interact and communi-
cate with each other in order to produce and visualize risk information for
an incident specified by a user. For each arrow in the diagram connecting
one component with another, or one component with a user, a number is
given, referencing the items in the list below the diagram. In this list, we
provide a detailed account for each step of the interaction, sorted in the
order of occurrence.
Figure 10.1 also highlights the technologies utilized in the implementa-
tion, respectively listed in each of the three components. As shown in the
figure, the implementation as a whole was realized using Java combined
with a variety of different technologies: The risk visualization map was de-
veloped as a web application using Google Web Toolkit (GWT) Software De-
velopment Kit (SDK) [15]. The risk visualization generator makes use of Java
API for KML (JAK) in order to generate visualization data [23]. Google Maps
is used as a digital geospatial environment for visualizing risk in the risk
visualization map [16]. Visualization data is defined in Keyhole Markup Lan-
guage (KML) [42], while GeoXml [14] is utilized to render visualizations.
In the remainder of this chapter we explain each component in more detail,
focusing on functionality and technology.
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Figure 10.1: Solution implementation structure
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10.2 Risk Visualization Map
The risk visualization map is responsible for receiving incident data from
users, and communicating visualizations to users by rendering these in a
digital geospatial environment. For the sake of accessibility, the risk visu-
alization map was built as a web application, allowing for cross-platform
compatibility where users can interact with the solution through a web
browser, without having to install any new software. In accordance with
the requirements specified in Chapter 5, the implementation is capable
of 1.) receiving risk information queries from a user, 2.) sending risk
information queries to a risk visualization controller, 3.) receiving visu-
alization data from a risk visualization controller, and 4.) rendering this
visualization data in a digital geospatial environment. The requirements
regarding filtering and prioritization of risk visualizations has not been
implemented, due to lack of time. On the technical side, the web applica-
tion was implemented using GWT SDK, which is a software development
toolkit for building complex AJAX web applications in Java [15]. As a
digital geospatial environment for visualizing risk information, we utilize
Google Maps, which is available for GWT by means of the Google Maps API
[16]. To render visualization data onto the map, we make use of GeoXml
[14], which is a third party Open Source XML parser.
10.2.1 User Interface
As shown in the screenshot provided in Figure 10.2, the main part of the
risk visualization map consists of a large interactive map (1). This map
serves two primary purposes including 1.) providing the solution with
a digital geospatial environment in which visualization data can be ren-
dered, and 2.) as a means to help users specify the location of an inci-
dent. On the top right corner of the user interface, we have included a
streetview widget (2), capable of showing photos of incident sites. Below
the streetview widget there is a directions map (3), capable of showing di-
rections to incident sites. An options menu (4) is included on the bottom
right corner, providing the user with facilities to Add a new incident, Load
incident and Clear map. As explained in the following sections, this menu
allows a user to request and visualize risk information for a given incident,
through building a risk information query.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Figure 10.2: The user interface of the risk visualization map, including:
(1) a main map where visualizations are rendered, (2) a streetview widget
capable of showing photos of incident sites, (3) a directions map capable of
showing directions to incident sites, and (4) an options menu where users
can request risk information.
10.2.2 Receiving Risk Information Queries
In order to visualize risk information for an incident, the risk visualization
map must first be provided with a risk information query containing a de-
scription of the incident in terms of incident type and incident location (as
specified in Chapter 5). To support generation of risk information queries,
our implementation makes it possible for users to “Add a new incident” to
the map by specifying type of incident from a fixed list of incident types,
and incident location either from an address (see Figure 10.3) or by select-
ing the location directly in the map (see Figure 10.4). When a new incident
is added to the map, a risk information query is built containing a textual
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description of the type of incident (e.g. wildfire, building fire), and a lat-
itude/longitude coordinate representing the exact geographical location
of the incident. In Figure 10.3 and Figure 10.4, we provide a set of screen-
shots illustrating the process of visualizing risk information for incidents
by adding these to the map (i.e. building a risk information query). As
shown in these figures, only two incident types have been implemented,
including house fires and wildfires.
10.2.3 Communicating with the Server
After a risk information query has been built (as described in Section 10.2.2),
the query is then sent to the risk visualization controller for further pro-
cessing. To facilitate communication between the risk visualization map
and the risk visualization controller we make use of remote procedure calls
(RPC), enabling a web client to execute procedures located on a back-end
server [15]. When a risk information query is built, a RPC containing the
query is sent through an interface connecting the risk visualization map
(client) with the risk visualization controller (server-side) (see Figure 10.1).
The RPC executes a method call on the risk visualization controller to pro-
cess the query. Upon completion, the RPC returns a true or false value to
the risk visualization map, telling it whether or not visualization data was
generated successfully (see Figure 10.1).
10.2.4 Rendering Visualization Data
If the RPC responsible for processing the risk information query on the
server (as described in Section 10.2.3) returns true, this means that the call
was successful and that new visualization data is available. In order to
render this visualization data onto the map, we make use of GeoXml [14],
which is a third party Open Source XML parser. Utilizing GeoXml, render-
ing the visualization data onto the map can be achieved in three simple
steps including 1.) telling the parser where the visualization data is lo-
cated, 2.) telling the parser that the parsed data should be rendered on
top of the map, and 3.) running the parser. As all generated visualization
data is stored in the same location on the server, and rendered onto the
same map, the three steps above are only necessary the first time visual-
ization data is parsed. Thereafter, we only have to tell the parser to update
its visualizations, whenever new data is available. Advantageously, and
in difference from the GGeoXml parser included in the Google Maps API,
GeoXml supports client-based parsing, meaning that we are not dependent
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Figure 10.3: Building a risk information query for a house fire
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Figure 10.4: Building a risk information query for a wildfire
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on an Internet connection in order to parse visualization data. Further-
more, the GeoXml parser also supports a wide variety of geospatial XML
formats, including GML, GPX, GeoRSS and KML, making the risk visual-
ization map a highly generic component.
In general, the risk visualization map renders visualization data correctly,
as laid out in Chapter 8. There are however, some aspects of the visu-
alizations that do not work as intended. First and foremost, we did not
manage to get the tabbed interface contained in the information balloons
to work properly. Instead, all the information about a risk object is dis-
played simultaneously when a risk object is clicked. Secondly, we did not
manage to implement the functionality to provide additional information
about underlying factors by clicking these inside the information balloon.
In Figure 10.5, we show an example of a visualization rendered in the map,
exemplifying both the aspects of the rendering that work well, and the is-
sues regarding tabbed information balloons, as highlighted above.
Consequence  Likelihood     Factors
Consequence of detached home ﬁre:
Life and Health: Catastrophic
House
Figure 10.5: Rendered Visualization Data
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10.2.5 Additional Functionality
In addition to the core functionality as described above, we also imple-
mented other functions that we thought would be a useful addition to the
risk visualization map. The Load incident button for instance (see Figure
10.2) provides functionality to render visualization data for an incident
that has been specified by another user, without having to build a new
risk information query. In simple terms, this is achieved by checking if
previously defined visualization data is available, and then loading this
data if it exists. By including this function, we aim to support collabora-
tion among operative leaders, where multiple users can view and interact
with the same visualization data simultaneously.
The Clear map button (see Figure 10.2) provides the user with functionality
to remove all visualization data from the map. Notably, the data is only
removed from the map, and not deleted from the server. The rationale
for keeping the data on the server is to make sure the data is available for
other users that are viewing the same visualization using a different client.
The streetview widget (see Figure 10.2), which is provided through the Google
Maps API [16], makes it possible for users to view panoramic photos of
the building or area where the specified incident occurred. As one will
notice if interacting with the risk visualization map, the streetview works
best when the location of the incident is bound up to a building. In cases
where the specified incident occurred in a rural area, the streetview typ-
ically does not work very well, as no photos are available for these lo-
cations. Nevertheless, we believe that the streetview function could be a
valuable addition to the risk visualizations, increasing operative leaders
understanding of incident location.
The directions map (see Figure 10.2) provides users with directions to the
location of the specified incident, from the location of their headquarters.
The functionality to generate directions and draw these onto a map is pro-
vided through the Google Maps API. Although the current directions map
only contains the information about the route to the target destination, one
could easily add additional information such as time, length, and current
traffic, using the API.
Last but not least, it should be emphasized that the main map, the direc-
tions map, and the streetview widget (see Figure 10.2) come with a num-
ber of controls to alter the representation of the map and the photos (e.g.
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zoom, panning). This functionality is automatically provided as a part of
Google Maps. Furthermore, the API also made it possible to include a
number of different map types that the user can choose from, including
satellite images, terrain, basic maps, and 3D maps.
10.3 Risk Visualization Controller
The risk visualization controller is responsible for facilitating the commu-
nication between all the other components in a solution, including com-
munication between external- and internal components. In accordance
with the requirements specified in Chapter 5, the implemented controller
is capable of 1.) receiving a risk information query from the risk visual-
ization map and forwarding this query to the risk information generator,
2.) receiving risk data from the risk information generator and forwarding
this data to the risk visualization generator, and 3.) receiving visualization
data from the risk visualization generator and forwarding this data to the
risk visualization map. As the structure of the controller is quite straight-
forward (i.e. sending and receiving data objects), we have decided not to
go into details about the implementation of this component. One aspect
worth mentioning however, is that the risk visualization controller never
actually sends visualization data to the risk visualization map. Instead,
the controller writes visualization data to a public KML file (using JAKs’
marshal method) residing on the server side, and notifies the risk visualiza-
tion map that new visualization data is available (this is achieved through
RPCs as explained in Section 10.2.3), forcing it to reload its visualization
data. This way, we increase performance by reducing the amount of data
we have to send to the client. Additionally, this design also makes it pos-
sible to distribute visualization data to multiple clients simultaneously.
10.4 Risk Visualization Generator
The risk visualization generator is responsible for converting risk data into
visualization data that can be rendered by the risk visualization map. In
accordance with the requirements specified in Chapter 5, the generator is
capable of 1.) receiving risk data from the risk visualization controller, 2.)
converting risk data into visualization data, and 3.) sending visualization
data to the risk visualization controller. In the remainder of this section,
we describe the implementation in detail, focusing first and foremost on
the representation of risk data and visualization data.
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10.4.1 Risk Data
In Section 5.2.1 we defined a number of requirements describing what in-
formation risk data must contain in order to fulfill the needs identified in
Chapter 4. To meet these requirements in our implementation, we devel-
oped a data model capable of holding all the required pieces of data. A
class diagram of this model can be seen in Figure 10.6. In this model, risk
Figure 10.6: Risk model class diagram
information objects, as described in Section 5.2.1 are represented by means
of the class EMRisk. In order to include all the required pieces of data,
each EMRisk instance contains a number of other risk data objects, such
as an EMRiskValue (holding the risk-value of the risk object), an EMAsset
(holding a description of the asset at stake for the given risk) and an EMLo-
cation (holding coordinates representing the geographical location/extent
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of the risk object). Notably, the location/extent of a risk object may be
represented as a point (EMPoint), an area (EMArea) or by a point and an
area (EMPointArea). By including these 3 options for representing the
location/extent of a risk object, we conform to the notion of distinguish-
ing between small-, medium- and large extent risk objects, as specified in
Chapter 8. Notably also, the EMEllipse class is used to represent an inci-
dents’ affected area.
10.4.2 Visualization Data
In Chapter 8 we introduced a revised proposal towards visualization of
risk, conforming to the requirements defined in Chapter 5. In order to im-
plement this proposal, we developed a visualization data model (see Fig-
ure 10.7) somewhat reflecting the risk data model shown in Figure 10.6. In
difference from the risk model however, the data types in the visualization
model represent the types of elements contained within a risk visualiza-
tion, as specified in the revised visualization proposal. To enable the data
types in the visualization model to represent graphical elements, we make
use of JAK, which is an object oriented Java API for specifying visualiza-
tions in the Keyhole Markup Language (KML) which is “an XML language
focused on geographic visualization, including annotation of maps and images”
[42]. By utilizing the descriptors of KML as made available through JAK,
we were able to define Java classes that represent all the graphical ele-
ment types used in risk visualizations, including points, lines, polygons
and 3D models, formatted by means of attributes such as color, text, size
and location. In particular, risk visualization objects as described in Section
5.2.1, are represented in the model by means of the KMLRisk class (see
Figure 10.7) containing a KMLDescription (i.e. an interactive information
balloon holding additional information about the risk object) and a KM-
LLocation (i.e. a polygon, point or both). The graphical representation
of incident information is handled by the KMLIncident class, containing
a KMLPointArea (a point representing the location of the incident, and a
polygon representing the area affected by the incident).
The rationale for choosing KML to represent visualization data as opposed
to other alternatives, was first and foremost that KML, being an Open
Geospatial Consortium (OGC) standard [42], is supported in a wide va-
riety of GISs and geobrowsers, including geobrowsers running on mobile
devices. Furthermore, another reason for choosing KML was its support
for building interactive visualizations that adapt to user input. In particu-
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Figure 10.7: KML model class diagram
lar, the latter made it possible to add interactive information balloons (as
described in Chapter 8) to elements in visualizations. Additionally, KML
also inherently satisfies the requirements regarding scalability of visual-
izations for different display sizes and resolutions, as described in Chapter
5. The other technical requirements, regarding graphical element size and
use of colors, were met by means of a KML Styles included in the KML
file, defining the size of elements and colors used in the visualizations.
10.4.3 Converting Risk Data into Visualization Data
In order to convert risk data into visualization data, we parse the content
of the risk data model (see Figure 10.6), into the visualization data model
(see Figure 10.7). To achieve this, the visualization model is designed so
that each visualization class must be provided with a certain piece of risk
data in order to instantiate an object from that class. As an example of this,
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the constructor of the KML class, must be provided with an EMDatamodel
in order to instantiate a KML object, while the KMLPoint constructor must
be provided with an EMPoint in order to instantiate a KMLPoint instance.
Intuitively, the parsing of risk data is handled in a hierarchy within the
visualization model, so that each class is responsible for providing its de-
pendencies with the right risk data. To exemplify this, the KML class con-
structor is responsible for providing the KMLDocument constructor with
an EList containing EMRisk objects and an EMArea, while the KMLInci-
dent class is responsible for providing the KMLLine with an EMPoint. The
parsing from risk data to visualization data is thus distributed among all
the classes included in the visualization model.
10.4.4 Communicating with the Controller
The communication between the risk visualization generator and the risk
visualization controller includes receiving risk data from the risk visualiza-
tion controller and sending visualization data to the risk visualization con-
troller. Following from the structure of the visualization model as shown
in Figure 10.7, both of these communicative functions are inherently pro-
vided by the KML class constructor. The first reason for this is that when
a new KML instance is defined in the risk visualization controller, this in-
stance is the visualization data, causing the controller to have direct access
to it. The second reason is that in order to instantiate a KML object, one
must provide the KML constructor with an EMDatamodel, making sure
risk data is received by the risk visualization generator.
In this chapter, we have described how each component in a solution
for visualization of risk can be implemented using Open Source technolo-
gies only. In the following chapter we summarize and conclude this thesis,
and point out directions for future work.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
The overall aim of this thesis was to advance an understanding of how
visualization can be used as a means to facilitate communication of risk
information to operative leaders working in emergency situations. In light
of this aim, the specific research objectives of this thesis were to:
1. Identify the needs of operative leaders regarding access to- and
communication of risk information during emergency situations.
2. Formulate requirements that solutions for visualization of risk should
satisfy in order to meet the needs of operative leaders.
3. Develop a solution for visualization of risk that satisfies the previ-
ously specified requirements.
4. Evaluate the proposed solution for visualization of risk with re-
spect to the needs of operative leaders.
In the first section of this chapter, we will summarize the findings for
each research objective, and propose conclusions based on the findings.
Following this, we then move on to point out recommendations and di-
rections for future work in Section 11.2. Conclusively, we round off this
chapter by reflecting on our contribution to knowledge in Section 11.2.
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11.1 Summary of Findings and Conclusions
11.1.1 Research Objective 1: Risk Visualization Needs
The review of existing research presented in Chapter 4 identified a vari-
ety of risk information that operative leaders, depending on the context,
might need access to in order to make sound decisions during emergency
situations. Aside from understanding the criticality of risk in terms of risk-
value, the reviewed research indicated that operative leaders also need to
obtain insight into the likelihood and consequence constituting risk. Fur-
thermore, we found that operative leaders, in order to rationalize risk, and
to determine how emergency situations might evolve in the future, also
need to understand which underlying factors that affect likelihood and
consequence. The review also showed that operative leaders have a need
to understand the geospatial aspect of risk, including incident location,
the extent of the area affected by an incident, and the location of physical
objects posing risk within this area. A need for understanding how risks
differ from one another in terms of criticality, was also identified.
[Conclusion 1]: The general conclusion regarding - access to risk infor-
mation - is that to develop a sound understanding of risk in emergency
situations, operative leaders should not only have access to risk critical-
ity information, but also be provided with information describing the
consequence and likelihood constituting risk, the underlying factors af-
fecting likelihood and consequence, and the characteristics and location
of physical objects posing risk.
With respect to communication of risk information, the reviewed research
indicated that operative leaders need access to risk information not only
while working in a local control post, but also while moving about in mo-
bile, outdoor settings. Importantly, it was also suggested in the reviewed
research that operative leaders have a need to prioritize information with
regards to priority, and/or filter information in terms of relevance. Draw-
ing on the dynamic nature of risk, it was also emphasized that operative
leaders need to be made aware of change in risk, so that they can sustain
an updated view of the emergency situation.
[Conclusion 2]: The main conclusion regarding - communication of risk
information -, is that operative leaders have a need to access, prioritize
and/or filter risk information in both fixed and mobile settings.
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11.1.2 Research Objective 2: Risk Visualization Require-
ments
In Chapter 5 we formulated a set of requirements that solutions for vi-
sualization of risk should satisfy in order to meet the needs of operative
leaders as identified in Chapter 4. In general, we specified that a solu-
tion for visualization of risk at least should consist of the following three
components (see Figure 5.2 for more details):
• A risk visualization map that can receive risk information queries
from its users, and that is capable of visualizing risk visualization
data in a digital geospatial environment.
• A risk visualization controller capable of handling all communica-
tion between components in the solution.
• A risk visualization generator capable of converting risk data into
visualization data that express all required risk information types.
In addition to incident information, visualization data should also be ca-
pable of expressing and communicating risk value; risk consequence; risk
likelihood; risk asset; underlying factors affecting risk; location of the phys-
ical objects posing risk; and the nature of these objects. Furthermore, visu-
alizations produced by this data should also be scalable to support view-
ing on handheld devices as well as desktop computers.
[Conclusion 3]: The general conclusion regarding - risk visualization
requirements - is that a solution for visualization of risk should not only
be capable of visualizing the required risk information types, but also
allow for users to specify incidents for which they want to visualize
risk information for. Importantly also, the solution should be adapted
to work on both mobile, and fixed equipment, and utilize a geospatial
digital environment for visualization.
11.1.3 Research Objective 3: Risk Visualization Solution
In Chapter 6 we proposed a first version of a solution for visualization of
risk, which was then revised in Chapter 8, and furthermore implemented
in Chapter 10. To satisfy the requirement towards a geospatial represen-
tation of risk, incident- and risk objects were visualized directly on top of
a digital map, positioned on their respective locations. To represent risk
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object criticality (i.e. risk value) a color-scale ranging through green, yel-
low, orange and red was utilized, respectively denoting low, moderate,
high and catastrophic risk. All risk objects were colorized according to the
risk level they represented. Furthermore, to maintain a balance between
the visibility of risk objects regardless of their size (as physical size does
not necessarily correlate with the risk object importance), the solution was
designed to differentiate between small-, medium- and large-extent risk
objects. Large-extent risk objects were represented by means of polygons,
medium extent risk objects were represented by means of polygons and
icons, and small extent risk objects were represented solely by means of
icons. Additional information about the risk objects’ consequence, likeli-
hood and underlying factors was included within an information balloon
displayed only when a risk object was clicked by a user.
[Conclusion 4]: Based on the findings from the evaluations, the main
conclusion with regards to - visualization of risk - is that:
• The color-scale green-yellow-orange-red is an efficient and effec-
tive means for representing risk criticality for small- and medium
extent risk objects.
• Symbolized icons positioned on a digital map are effective and ef-
ficient for representing the nature and location of physical objects
posing risk.
• Information balloons displayed only on request are efficient for
including additional information about risk objects.
• Using a tabbed interface within information balloons might cause
excessive interaction and make it cumbersome to compare risk ob-
jects with one another.
• Polygons alone are seemingly not sufficient for representing large
extent risk objects.
The implementation of the solution was realized using Java combined with
a variety of different technologies: The risk visualization map was devel-
oped as a web application using Google Web Toolkit (GWT) Software Devel-
opment Kit (SDK) [15]. The risk visualization generator makes use of Java API
for KML (JAK) in order to generate visualization data [23]. Google Maps
is used as a digital geospatial environment for visualizing risk in the risk
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visualization map [16]. Visualization data is defined in Keyhole Markup Lan-
guage (KML) [42], while GeoXml [14] is utilized to render visualizations.
[Conclusion 5]: Based on our general impression while developing and
testing the implementation, the main conclusion with regards to - visu-
alization technology - is that:
• The Keyhole Markup Language has expressivity to depict all re-
quired graphical elements and attributes needed to visualize risk.
• Google Maps provide an intuitive and effective environment for
geospatial visualization of risk.
• The GeoXml parser provides client-based parsing, but does not
support the full range of KML elements.
• By making use of a client-server model in solutions for visualiza-
tion of risk, one can increase performance, and distribute visual-
ization data to multiple clients simultaneously.
• By building the client side of a solution for visualization of risk as
a web application, one can achieve a higher degree of accessibility.
• A solution for visualization of risk can efficiently and effectively
be realized using Open Source technologies only.
11.1.4 Research Objective 4: Risk Visualization Evaluation
In Chapter 7 and Chapter 9, we evaluated the proposed solution for visu-
alization of risk with respect to the previously identified needs. In the first
evaluation, we found that the visualizations made it possible for users
to get an overview of emergency situations, identify risk objects, under-
stand underlying factors affecting risk, and what assets that were at stake.
In terms of problematic aspects, we found that the visualizations did not
provide a clear representation of risk-level, consequence-value nor what
unwanted incident the likelihood- and consequence information was to
be associated with. Furthermore, our findings showed that the visual-
izations were ambiguous with respect to the representation of risk object
types, and in their use of color to represent meaning.
After revising the solution with respect to the identified problems and
the suggestions for improvement, a new evaluation was conducted, this
time focusing on usability in the form of effectiveness, efficiency and user
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satisfaction. In terms of effectiveness, the evaluation showed that the so-
lution to a large extent does generate insight among its users, with re-
spect to the risk information it is meant to convey. Through interacting
with the visualizations, users developed a comprehensive understanding
of the emergency situations, enabling them to determine how small- and
medium extent risk objects should be prioritized during an emergency re-
sponse operation, and to rationalize why some of these risk objects are
more critical than others. With regards to efficiency, we found that the
solution generally generated insight in an efficient manner. Within min-
utes of interacting with the visualizations, and without receiving any form
of training, users were capable of explaining the emergency situations in
terms of incident- and risk information, determining the order in which
(small- and medium extent) risk objects should be prioritized, and ratio-
nalizing their choice of prioritization using the available information. Re-
garding user satisfaction, we found that users generally perceived the so-
lution as useful, rating the visualizations as both easy to understand and
easy to navigate. Nevertheless, users seemed to be frustrated with how
large extent risk objects were represented, and with the tabbed interface
utilized in the information balloons.
[Conclusion 6]: Conclusively, the findings from the evaluations indicate
that the proposed solution for visualization of risk does enable users
to access and understand risk associated with emergency situations. In
particular, the solution seems to be efficiently and effectively capable of
generating insight that enables users to prioritize between small- and
medium extent risk objects related to an incident, and to understand
why some risk objects are more critical than others. However, the find-
ings also show that the solution is incapable of communicating large-
extent risk objects.
11.2 Recommendations
From Conclusion 6, we recommend geospatial visualization as an effective
and efficient means for generating insight that enables decision makers to
prioritize between risk objects related to an incident, and to understand
why some risk objects are more critical than others. Importantly however,
with respect to Conclusion 1, risk visualizations should not only depict
risk in terms of criticality, but also offer insight into the underpinning con-
sequence, likelihood and factors constituting risk, along with risk loca-
tion and nature. To achieve the latter, we recommend (in accordance with
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Conclusion 4), that solutions for visualization of risk make use of digital
geospatial environments for communicating risk location, color to repre-
sent risk criticality, icons to represent risk object type and information bal-
loons to hold additional information about risk objects. Specifically, draw-
ing on Conclusion 5, we recommend using Keyhole Markup Language as
an environment for generating such risk visualizations, and Google Maps
as a digital geospatial environment.
With regards to future work, there is a clear need for more research to
confirm the findings presented in this thesis. In particular, it would be
interesting to repeat the usability testing for actual operative leaders, and
thus determine how and if operative leaders’ interpretation of risk differs
from that of non-professionals. Another fruitful direction for future work
is to shed light on the usability of the user interface utilized in the risk vi-
sualization map. Furthermore, there is also a need to determine in what
extent the solution is fit to represent other types of risk objects than those
utilized in this thesis. Finally, for further development of the solution in-
troduced in this thesis, we recommend starting with the suggestions for
improvement identified in Chapter 9.
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Spørreskjema
Vennligst fyll ut spørsmålene nedenfor så godt du kan, utifra det inntrykket du fikk av 
visualiseringene tidligere i evalueringen. 
* Required
Visualiseringene gir en god oversikt over nødsituasjonen:*
Veldig uenig 
Uenig 
Verken enig eller uenig 
Enig 
Veldig enig
Visualiseringene er lette å forstå:*
Veldig uenig 
Uenig 
Verken enig eller uenig 
Enig 
Veldig enig
Visualiseringene inneholder informasjon som gjør det enklere å planlegge hvordan man skal 
håndtere nødsituasjonen:*
Veldig uenig 
Uenig 
Verken enig eller uenig 
Enig 
Veldig enig
Visualiseringene er forvirrende og/eller vanskelige å forstå:*
Veldig uenig 
Uenig 
Verken enig eller uenig 
Enig 
Veldig enig
Visualiseringene gir en god oversikt over hva som står i fare for å skje som følge av ulykken:*
Veldig uenig 
Uenig 
Verken enig eller uenig 
Enig 
Veldig enig
Visualiseringene er enkle å navigere seg gjennom:*
Veldig uenig 
Uenig 
Verken enig eller uenig 
Enig 
Veldig enig
Var noen aspekter av visualiseringene forvirrende eller vanskelige å forstå? 
Beskriv (og begrunn hvis mulig) disse aspektene i tekstboksen nedenfor.
Var noen deler av visualiseringene mer nyttige enn andre?
Beskriv (og begrunn hvis mulig) disse aspektene i tekstboksen nedenfor.
Har du noen forslag til hvordan visualiseringene kan forbedres?
Beskriv (og begrunn hvis mulig) disse forslagene i tekstboksen nedenfor.
Submit
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